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Editorial
Like other advanced economies, the euro area is 
in the midst of its most severe economic crisis in 
the post-war era. Some very early signs of 
improvement have been visible in the past few 
weeks. Stock prices have been rising, and lower 
money and bond market spreads, along with 
reduced exchange rate volatility, signal some 
measure of stabilisation. In addition, business 
and consumer confidence has improved over the 
past two months in the euro area while some 
'green shoots' have also been springing up in the 
global economy since the beginning of the year, 
particularly in a number of emerging markets. 
Thus, the worst seems to be behind us in terms 
of GDP contraction and our spring forecast 
predicts a subdued recovery for 2010. 
However, we should not be premature and think 
that the crisis is over. Economic activity remains 
depressed, with GDP in the first quarter 
showing the fastest rate of contraction in 
decades. The current level of confidence 
indicators is still consistent with a contraction in 
activity. Negative growth surprises could result 
from substantial inventory corrections. Rising 
unemployment could further shatter confidence 
and weigh heavily on recovery. In addition, while 
the financial system seems to have stabilised, 
banks’ balance sheets remain fragile. Moreover, 
short-term volatility in financial markets remains 
elevated compared to pre-crisis levels.  
On a more positive note, the EU is delivering. 
The EU's strong and coordinated policy 
response has provided considerable support to 
the economy, as evidenced by various indicators. 
Our assessment of the progress made with the 
European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) – 
which was endorsed by the December 2008 
European Council – is encouraging. While the 
assessment can only be preliminary at this stage, 
the measures undertaken by Member States are 
broadly in line with the principles laid down in 
the EERP. They are for the most part timely, 
targeted, temporary, coordinated and consistent 
with the euro-area's long-term structural reform 
agenda. One of the main messages to be drawn 
from our analysis is that the action taken so far 
amounts to a strong and focused response to the 
crisis. Gross errors made in past crises have so 
far been avoided.  
However, there are some indications that, in 
their recovery efforts, Member States' policy 
reforms may accentuate some of the pre-crisis 
drivers of competitiveness divergence. Future 
recovery steps should aim more to reduce 
harmful competitiveness divergence, for 
example, by boosting productivity in countries 
with weak competitiveness. 
Euro-area policy-makers have implemented 
sizeable financial rescue packages. In this issue 
of our Quarterly Report on the Euro Area we 
present an assessment of the effectiveness of the 
banking support measures taken by Member 
States since autumn 2008. The measures have 
provided financial institutions with substantial 
public resources, mainly in the form of 
recapitalisation, debt guarantees, asset swaps 
and, to a lesser extent, asset reliefs. Capital 
injections by government have allowed banks' 
capital to stabilise despite large asset write-
downs. State guarantees on securities issues have 
been a significant bank support measure in all 
Member States. State-guaranteed issues have 
increased considerably without signs of 
crowding out of non-guaranteed issuance. Net 
issuance of debt securities by banks has returned 
to pre-crisis levels. Moreover, the functioning of 
interbank markets has improved significantly 
although the return to conditions considered to 
be normal before the financial crisis has been 
only partial.  
Beyond the immediate response to the crisis, we 
need a consistent and coordinated strategy to 
ensure that the euro-area economy does not get 
trapped in a sluggish and disappointing recovery.  
On the financial side, bank balance sheets are 
still fragile and there is considerable uncertainty 
about the capacity of many banks to absorb 
losses linked to assets that may become impaired 
as the effects of the economic down-cycle feed 
through. A consistent and coordinated strategy is 
needed to fully restore investor confidence and 
pave the way for the restructuring the banking 
system needs. Such a strategy should focus on 
removing investors’ uncertainty of the quality of 
banks' balance sheets.   
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More generally, in addition to restoring the 
health of the banking sector, the faults of the 
financial system that have been so painfully 
exposed in the current turmoil must be fixed. 
We need to put in place a new and more 
effective supervisory framework. The European 
Commission therefore presented a 
Communication on 27 May 2009 – broadly 
endorsed by the European Council of 18/19 
June – setting out the way forward to establish a 
new framework for macro- and micro-prudential 
supervision. Following on from the report of the 
de Larosière group, it proposes a European 
Systemic Risk Board, which will monitor and 
assess potential threats to financial stability and, 
where necessary, issue recommendations for 
action. It also recommends that a European 
System of Financial Supervisors be established, 
aimed at safeguarding financial soundness in 
individual financial firms and protecting 
consumers of financial services. Moreover, it 
appears equally important to make rapid 
progress on work to build a comprehensive 
European framework for the management of 
financial crises. The European Union continues 
to take the lead on supervisory and regulatory 
reform and is promoting these reforms in 
international fora.  
The key challenge regarding macroeconomic and 
structural policies is to continue to provide 
support to the economy as long as necessary 
without compromising the stability-oriented 
objectives in the medium to long term. Policy-
makers should prepare a credible strategy for 
fiscal policy so as to be able gradually to 
withdraw the stimulus once the recovery takes 
hold. Eventually, budgetary developments will 
need to be put back on a sustainable path. A 
broad reflection is also needed on the role and 
function of automatic stabilisers, the aim being 
to strengthen their anti-cyclical properties 
without hampering efficient allocation of 
resources and triggering perverse incentives. 
Monetary policy will have to continue to ensure 
that inflation expectations remain anchored in 
the medium run. Moreover, reflection is needed 
on the role of asset prices for the conduct of 
macroeconomic policy. Short-term structural 
measures that slow adjustment should be 
avoided and withdrawn as soon as the recovery 
is well established.  
Finally, we need to address the medium- to long-
term consequences of financial crises on 
potential growth. As discussed in the first focus 
section of the report, historical evidence shows 
that severe financial crises tend to have a 
permanent negative effect on the level of output. 
Available evidence also points to a substantial 
risk of a lasting drop in productivity growth after 
recessions. To contain permanent losses in the 
level of potential output and reduce the risks of 
a lasting deceleration of potential growth, timely 
and appropriate policy responses are crucial. In 
addition to addressing disruptions in financial 
markets, policy-makers need to limit the adverse 
impact of the crisis on R&D and physical 
investment by stepping up investment support. 
Similarly, the necessary restructuring of sectors 
and businesses – although politically challenging 
– should not be hampered so as to avoid any 
permanent efficiency losses. Moreover, policies 
should enhance adjustment capacities in the 
labour market, e.g. with targeted action to 
improve employability and training. Protectionist 
policies undermining the Single Market and 
measures reducing labour supply need to be 
avoided at all costs. 
Crisis-related risk to productivity and growth 
trends are all the more worrying as ageing will 
soon start to affect our economies. Our long-
term projections indicate that the budgetary 
consequence of ageing can be substantial. 
Moreover, GDP growth potential is projected to 
decline already in the next decade on account of 
demographic trends. We therefore need to 
concentrate all our efforts on implementing 
policies that are intertemporally consistent and 
designed to resolve this crisis quickly and 
increase our growth potential. 
 
 
MARCO BUTI 
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I. Economic and financial situation in the euro area 
Sizeable policy interventions and early signs of 'green shoots' in real activity seem to have succeeded in bringing some degree of 
stabilisation to the financial system. This has been reflected in rising stock prices, lower money and bond market spreads. 
However, short-term volatility remains high and financial uncertainty elevated compared to pre-crisis levels. Regarding the real 
side of the economy, the first quarter of 2009 witnessed the worst rate of GDP contraction since at least the 1970s. The 
contraction was mostly driven by an inventory adjustment and another sharp fall in investment. Thanks to the deceleration of 
consumer price inflation and some support from nominal disposable income, the slump in private consumption has so far 
remained comparatively contained. Nevertheless, dismal labour market prospects may have a dampening effect on consumer 
spending in the quarters to come. While world trade remains depressed, its previous free fall seems to have come to a halt. 
Moreover, improved global prospects, mostly in some emerging markets, have spilled over into a modest pick-up of confidence 
in the euro area. This suggests that the worst is behind us in terms of GDP contraction, although indicators of the real 
economy remain very weak and prospects of a return to growth are still very distant.  
The substantial banking support measures implemented by the Member States since autumn 2008 have helped to avert 
financial meltdown. Though a final assessment of their effectiveness would be premature, the measures have had a positive 
impact on banks' capital and access to wholesale funding, but the situation remains fragile. The aggregate level of bank 
capital in the euro area has stabilised under the opposing influences of further asset write-downs and capital injections by 
government. In the absence of these capital injections, there would have been a sharp fall in bank capital, with obvious 
implications for solvency. Developments in price indicators of financial distress suggest that the functioning of interbank 
markets has improved significantly. However, the convergence process towards conditions considered to be normal before the 
financial crisis has been partial and unsteady. The deceleration in bank lending has continued in recent months, reflecting 
predominantly demand weakness but also supply factors in the banking sector. Overall, the situation in the sector remains 
fragile and further bank balance sheet adjustment will be needed. In particular, recent ECB estimates suggest that further 
significant asset write-downs are still to be expected. 
While the euro-area economy is in the midst of its deepest and most widespread recession in the post-war era, budgetary policy 
provides substantial support to economic activity. The flipside of the coin is a sharp increase in budget deficits and debts. From 
its low in 2007, the euro-area debt to GDP ratio is projected to increase by 18 pp to reach 84% of GDP in 2010, with the 
deficit climbing to 6.5% of GDP. The high deficit levels suggest further rises in the debt ratio in the years beyond 2010. 
Coupled with the expected increases in age-related expenditure, a slowdown in potential growth and possible calls on 
government guarantees extended in the context of financial rescue packages, this might put significant pressure on government 
finances for the years to come. 
1. Recent economic and financial 
developments and short-term 
prospects*  
Most financial markets are showing encouraging 
signs of stabilization although conditions in the 
global financial system remain fragile. The 
improvement in financial markets began in early 
March and was reflected in both increasing stock 
prices and narrowing credit market spreads. At 
the same time, rising loan defaults continue to 
weigh on banks' balance sheets. All in all, while it 
is too early to gauge whether the recent 
improvement in financial markets can be 
sustained, 'green shoots' in sentiment indicators 
* Section prepared by Aurora Mordonu and Martin 
Hradisky. 
and renewed confidence on financial markets are 
adding to increasing evidence that the economy 
might have the worst behind it.  
Money and bond markets point to further 
drops in spreads 
The ECB has provided further monetary policy 
stimulus to the euro-area economy over the last 
three months. It lowered its rate on the main 
refinancing operations of the Eurosystem in two 
steps, from 1.5% in March to 1.0% in May, thus 
bringing the total reduction in its key interest rate 
to 325 bps since the start of the present easing 
cycle last October. In addition, the ECB also 
implemented a number of 'non-standard' 
measures. First, in addition to the existing 
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liquidity-providing operations, it introduced 
longer-term repos with a maturity of 12 months. 
Second, it decided to purchase around EUR 
60 billion of euro-denominated covered bonds 
issued in the euro area over the next 12 months. 
Third, in order to support its financing initiatives, 
including lending programmes to SME, the EIB 
became an eligible counterparty in the 
Eurosystem's monetary policy operations. 
Fourth, the ECB announced the extension of the 
current (wider) collateral standards through to 
the end of 2010. 
Graph 1: Euro-area money market 
(in %, spread in pp, 1 Jan 2007 to 18 June 2009) 
0
1
2
3
4
5
Jan-07 May-07 Sep-07 Jan-08 May-08 Sep-08 Jan-09 Jun-09
Euribor, 3m
EONIA swap, 3m
spread
 
Source: EcoWin. 
Euro-area interbank rates have reacted positively 
to this supplementary monetary policy easing and 
to the comprehensive rescue packages put in 
place by governments to support the banking 
system (see also Section 2 'Assessing the 
effectiveness of banking support measures'). The 
3-month Euribor declined from slightly above 
1.5% at the end of March 2009 to around 1.25% 
by mid-June 2009 (Graph 1). The decline reflects 
a downward movement in risk premiums, which 
more than compensated for the slight increase in 
risk-free rates in recent months, amid some 
short-term volatility. Indeed, risk premiums, 
measured by 3-month interbank spreads (the 
difference between unsecured money market 
rates and risk-free interest rates with similar 
maturity) declined to around 50 bps on 18 June, 
down from 80 bps at the end of March 2009 and 
a peak of 200 bps in October 2008. While the 
latest ECB Bank Lending Survey from April 
2009 is consistent with an improvement in banks' 
access to funds, the interbank spreads still remain 
significantly above the levels observed during the 
pre-crisis period and financial institutions 
continue to hoard cash.  
In the bond markets, first rate sovereign bond 
yields have increased in recent months as growing 
confidence in the global economy's recovery 
prospects has lowered demand for fixed-income 
assets. However, the higher financing needs of 
public authorities also put upward pressure on 
government bond yields. In particular, the yield 
on the 10-year Bund rose from 3% at the end of 
March 2009 to slightly more than 3.55% by mid-
June 2009. At the same time, yield spreads on 
euro-denominated government bonds relative to 
the German Bund have narrowed since March 
2009, albeit from historically high levels, 
reflecting declines in sovereign credit risk amid 
improvement in economic sentiment and lower 
risk aversion in general. On 18 June, the 
sovereign spreads over the German Bund were at 
their highest in Greece and Ireland, at 199 bps 
and 177 bps respectively. They had declined by, 
respectively, 95 and 49 bps since March 2009.  
Graph 2: 10-year government bond spreads to Germany 
(in bps, 1 Jan 2007 to 18 June 2009) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
But money and credit growth is still 
decelerating  
In recent months, money and credit growth has 
been affected by the financial market turmoil, 
weak economic activity as well as portfolio shifts 
due to a sharply steepening yield curve (following 
the rapid reduction in the ECB's key rate). 
Although there are some signs that the pace of 
deceleration of M3 growth has eased recently, the 
strong expansion of base money at the end of 
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2008 is so far not reflected in broader monetary 
aggregates. Among the main M3 counterparts, 
loans granted to the euro-area private sector 
confirm an ongoing process of deleveraging in 
the private sector. The annual growth rate of 
loans to the private sector decreased to 2.4% in 
April, down from 5.0% in January. The 
deceleration of credit to the private sector was 
partly offset by a significant increase in credit 
extended to the general government.  
The ongoing slowdown in credit growth mainly 
reflects demand factors such as the moderation 
of economic activity and the contracting housing 
market. Looking at euro-area GDP growth and 
loan growth to the private sector (Graph 3), the 
co-movement over the last ten years is striking.  
Graph 3: Private sector loans and real GDP, euro area  
(annualised q-o-q growth in %, 1998Q1-2009Q1) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
However, supply-side factors as measured by 
banks' credit conditions also seem to have played 
a role. In this respect, the ECB's April 2009 bank 
lending survey for the euro area reported a 
further tightening of credit standards amid a 
weak macroeconomic and/or industry/firm-
specific outlook, although the pace of tightening 
eased compared to the last quarter of 2008. The 
net percentage of banks reporting a tightening of 
credit standards applied on loans and credit lines 
to enterprises was 43% in 2009Q1 (compared to 
64% in 2008Q4). The respective figures for loans 
to households for house purchases and for 
consumer credit were somewhat lower, at 28% 
(down from 41% a quarter before) and 26% 
(down from 42%).  At the same time, banks 
struggled to reduce their leverage and tried to 
return to profitability. 
Financing conditions are easing further 
Financing conditions in the euro area have 
improved in recent months, primarily reflecting 
the recent relief in financial markets.  
Euro-area equity prices have increased during the 
period under review amid fairly strong evidence 
of an inflexion point in the business cycle, which 
also contributed to a decline in stock market 
volatility (Graph 4). However, stock prices 
broadly stabilised in the first half of June 2009 as 
investors took profits and uncertainty over the 
sustainability of the latest stock market rally 
intensified. As of 18 June 2009, the Eurostoxx50 
had regained 33% from its low on 9 March 2009, 
returning roughly to its end of 2008 levels. Over 
the same period, the Eurostoxx sub-index for 
financial institutions outperformed the overall 
index, posting a 84% increase.  
Graph 4: Stock prices and implied volatility of stock 
prices, euro area (2 Jan 2007 to 18 June 2009) 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Eurostoxx financials (lhs) (1)
Eurostoxx 50 (lhs) (1)
Implied volatility (rhs) (2)
 
(1) Index Jan 2007 = 100.  
(2) In percentage points. 
Source: EcoWin. 
The general reduction in risk premiums observed 
during the period under review put downward 
pressure on corporate bond spreads over the 
German Bund. However, corporate bond 
markets still remain tight from a historical 
perspective (Graph 5). In particular, AAA 
spreads have declined by 22 bps since the end of 
March 2009 to roughly 78 bps on 18 June 2009, 
while BBB spreads have come down by 121 bps 
to 263 bps.  
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Graph 5: Corporate bond spreads, euro area 
(in bps, 1 Jan 2007 to 18 June 2009) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
According to the European Commission's 
Composite Nominal Financing Cost Indicator 
(CFCI), euro-area financing costs for non-
financial corporations and households have both 
declined by around 110 bps and 80 bps since 
their respective peaks in October 2008 
(Graph 6).  
Graph 6: Composite financial indicator, euro area 
(cost of manufacturing in %, Mar 2003 to April 2009) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
For non-financial corporations, the cost of bank 
loans, equity capital and market debt all declined, 
due to lower interest rates, rising stock prices and 
narrowing corporate bond spreads, respectively. 
For households, the cost of all types of loans 
continued to decline as both retail and market 
interest rates fell further. As a result, the April 
CFCI for households stood at its lowest level 
since July 2007. 
Exchange rates  
Exchange rate developments over the last few 
months have been largely driven by portfolio 
shifts as a result of changes in risk aversion and 
further unconventional measures taken by 
leading central banks. At the same time, volatility 
in foreign exchange rate markets has continued 
to recede, although it still remains significantly 
above the levels recorded before the onset of the 
present financial crisis in the summer of 2007.  
Following its peak in March 2009, the nominal 
effective exchange rate of the euro declined 
somewhat before stabilising in May 2009, albeit 
at high levels from a historical perspective. In 
real effective terms, i.e. taking into account 
inflation differentials between the euro area and 
its trading partners, the effective exchange rate of 
the euro closely mirrored developments in its 
nominal value and stood some 8% above 
historical averages in May 2009. The euro is thus 
looking on the strong side. 
Graph 7: Nominal (NEER) and real (REER) effective 
exchange rate of the euro 
(index Jan 2006=100, Jan 2006 to May 2009) 
95
100
105
110
115
Jan-06 Jul-06 Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09
REER deflated by HICP deflator
NEER
 
Source: EcoWin. 
These developments in the external value of the 
euro mask significant changes in its bilateral 
exchange rates against the world's major 
currencies. Indeed, the exchange rate of the euro 
against the US dollar fluctuated strongly in recent 
months as expectations of further monetary 
policy easing by the ECB gave way to increasing 
confidence that the world might be past the 
worst of the crisis, which in turn reduced risk 
aversion in international financial markets and 
curbed safe-haven flows to the US. 
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Consequently, after depreciating by 5% against 
the dollar between 26 March and 21 April, the 
euro rebounded by 7% by mid-June. On the 
other hand, the euro fluctuated within a relatively 
narrow range against the Japanese yen (between 
125 and 135 yen per euro) and remained broadly 
stable against the Swiss franc and Central 
European currencies. Finally, the single currency 
depreciated by 8% against the pound sterling as 
markets came to believe that the past falls in the 
pound were not fully justified by fundamentals. 
The worst rate of GDP contraction in the 
euro area since at least the 1970s 
Turning to the real side of the economy, activity 
in the euro area took another dip in the first 
quarter of 2009. With GDP dropping by 2.5% 
compared to the previous quarter, the euro-area 
economy suffered its worst rate of GDP 
contraction since at least the 1970s. This 
followed a downwardly revised 1.8% contraction 
in the last quarter of 2008 and marked the fourth 
consecutive quarterly decline in GDP. The 
contraction was broad-based across euro-area 
countries, except for Cyprus where activity 
remained flat. Of the Member States with data 
available so far, the fall in GDP was particularly 
sharp in Slovakia (-11.4%), Slovenia (-6.4%) and 
Germany (-3.8%). Conversely, Portugal and 
France held up better than expected, with milder 
than forecast contractions in output.  
Graph 8: Contribution to real GDP growth, euro area  
(q-o-q contributions in pp, 2007Q1 to 2009Q1)  
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Source: Commission services. 
Investment was again one of the main sources of 
weakness in activity. Gross fixed capital 
formation contracted by 4.2% (q-o-q), thereby 
subtracting as much as 0.9 pp from GDP 
growth. The breakdown of investment spending 
by sector shows that the contraction was mostly 
due to non-construction investment (essentially 
machinery and transport equipment), indicating 
that business investment is now driving the 
investment cycle. In contrast, the construction 
sector registered its smallest quarterly drop since 
the second quarter of 2008, with housing 
investment even posting a marginal increase. 
Faint signs of stabilisation have been also 
recently visible in Eurostat's monthly indicator of 
construction output (available to April). This may 
be an indication that the easing of financing 
conditions together with fiscal support measures 
have recently begun to help contain the sector's 
contraction. Nevertheless, confidence indicators 
in the construction sector have deteriorated 
further in recent months, suggesting that the 
sector's dynamics remains negative.  
Graph 9: Capacity utilisation and corporate profitability 
rates, euro area (in %, 1999Q1 to 2009Q1)  
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
1999-Q1 2000-Q3 2002-Q1 2003-Q3 2005-Q1 2006-Q3 2008-Q1
36
37
38
39
40
Capacity utilisation (lhs) (1)
Profitability rate (rhs) (2)
 
(1) In % of total capacity in manufacturing. 
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value added in the non-financial corporate sector.  
Source: Commission services. 
The extreme weakness of business investment is 
visible across a broad range of data. The April 
2009 reading of the quarterly manufacturing 
survey indicates a further fall in capacity 
utilisation, which now stands at 70.5 % in the 
euro area – the lowest since 1990. According to 
the biannual industrial investment survey carried 
out in March and April this year, 2009 real 
industrial investment is expected to drop by 20% 
in the euro area in 2009, which is a sharp 
downward revision from the 5% fall registered in  
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Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
Spring 2009 forecast 
2009 2010  2008 Q1 
2008 
Q2 
2008 
Q3 
2008 
Q4 
2009
Q1 
Carryover 
to 2009 
change on prev. year 
 Percentage change on previous period, volumes 
GDP 0.7 -0.3 -0.3 -1.8 -2.5  -4.0   -4.0 -0.1 
Private consumption 0.1 -0.3  0.1 -0.4 -0.5  -0.8   -0.9 -0.3 
Government consumption 0.4  0.8  0.5  0.4  0.0   0.8    2.0  1.7 
Gross fixed capital formation 1.1 -1.3 -1.0 -4.3 -4.2  -8.1 -10.4 -2.7 
Exports of goods and services 1.6 -0.3 -0.6 -7.2 -8.1 -13.5 -13.2 -0.3 
Imports of goods and services 1.2 -0.8  1.1 -5.1 -7.2 -10.5 -10.5 -0.8 
 Percentage point contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.0 -0.2  0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 
Government consumption 0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.4  0.4 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -1.0 -0.9 -1.8 -2.3 -0.6 
Changes in inventories 0.1 -0.2  0.4  0.3 -1.0 -0.3 -0.3  0.0 
Net exports 0.2  0.2 -0.7 -1.0 -0.4 -1.7 -1.3  0.2 
Source: Commission services. 
 
the previous survey in autumn 2008. The latest 
ECB Bank Lending Survey reported that the 
continued sharp decline in financing needs for 
fixed investment was the main cause of the 
negative net demand for loans by enterprises in 
Q1-2009. Finally, the profitability of non-
financial corporations has been severely hit by 
the recession. It deteriorated further in Q4-2008, 
with the gross profit share approaching its lowest 
level since 1999 (Graph 9). 
Household consumption contracted by 0.5% in 
the first quarter of 2009, still holding up relatively 
well compared to the other GDP components. 
The annual rate of contraction of household 
consumption stood at 1.1% y-o-y in the first 
quarter, while GDP contracted by a much 
sharper 4.8% over the same period. The 
comparative resilience of consumption at a time 
when the saving rate is on the rise (to 15.1% in 
Q4-2008, its highest level since the beginning of 
the decade) is explained by two factors: the 
ongoing strong disinflation process and some 
support from nominal disposable income. In the 
first quarter of 2009, inflation measured by the 
consumption deflator remained on the 
downward path it had been on since the second 
half of 2008, with y-o-y growth in prices down to 
0.5%. This downward path is explained by a 
combination of weak activity, falling commodity 
prices and strong base effects from past 
commodity price hikes. 
At the end of last year (last available data), 
growth in disposable income was holding up 
relatively well compared with GDP, with y-o-y 
nominal growth at 2.5% against 0.6% for GDP 
(Graph 10). This comparative strength can partly 
be explained by wage stickiness and lags in the 
response of employment to the slump in activity, 
which have so far dampened the impact of the 
recession on compensation. Automatic stabilisers 
have also played a role through a sharp 
deceleration in tax growth.  
Graph 10: Disposable income and GDP growth, euro 
area (in %, 1999 Q1 to 2009Q1) 
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(1) y-o-y changes.  
Source: Commission services. 
The effects of the two factors currently 
supporting household consumption are expected 
to evolve differently during 2009. The 
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 Table 2: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2008-2009 
 SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI Man.4) PMI Ser 5) IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8)
Long-term average 101 - 85.4 - - 96.8  -9.5 26.5 
May 2008 98.5 0.64 104.9 50.6 50.6 96.8 96.8 -41.4 
June 2008 95.9 0.27 104.1 49.2 49.1 94.3 94.3 -52.4 
July 2008 90.9 -0.02 103.2 47.4 48.3 89.6 89.6 -63.9 
August 2008 89.9 -0.07 102.2 47.6 48.5 86.8 86.8 -55.5 
September 2008 88.9 -0.55 101.0 45.0 48.4 86.3 86.3 -41.1 
October 2008 81.6 -1.04  99.8 41.1 45.8 81.4 81.4 -63.0 
November 2008 76.8 -1.75  98.8 35.6 42.5 77.8 77.8 -53.5 
December 2008 68.9 -2.68  98.0 33.9 42.1 77.0 77.0 -45.2 
January 2009 67.2 -2.77  97.6 34.4 42.2 79.5 79.5 -31.0 
February 2009 65.3 -3.25  97.4 33.5 39.2 81.0 81.0  -5.8 
March 2009 64.7 -3.42  97.7 33.9 40.9 81.6 81.6  -3.5 
April 2009 67.2 -3.26 - 36.8 43.8 83.9 83.9 13.0 
May 2009 69.3 -3.17 - 40.7 44.8 85.9 85.9 31.1 
Sources: 1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator. 
4) Bloomberg Purchasing Managers Index, manufacturing. 5)  Bloomberg Purchasing Manager Index, services. 6) Business expectations, West 
Germany. 7)  National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment, Germany 
 
disinflation process has clearly not reached its 
end, as shown by recent developments in HICP 
inflation, which stood at 0% (y-o-y) in May, 
down from 0.6% (y-o-y) in April. Inflation is 
forecast to remain low during the remainder of 
the year on account of the weak growth outlook 
and further base effects, although the risk of 
persistent and broad-based decreases in 
consumer prices remains low in the euro area. 
Low inflation will maintain a stimulating effect 
on consumption. In contrast, the relative 
resilience of disposable income should diminish 
as wage compensation is dampened by the 
ongoing progressive deterioration in the labour 
market. The pace of contraction of employment 
has increased steadily in the past three quarters to 
reach 0.8% q-o-q in Q1 while the unemployment 
rate has gained 2 pp since the beginning of 2008 
and is now back at a level last seen in the late 
1990s. 
Turning to what is currently one of the biggest 
sources of weakness in demand, changes in 
inventories subtracted as much as 1.0 pp from 
GDP growth in the first quarter. The rapid 
inventory build-up registered in the last quarter 
of last year, despite the sharp GDP contraction, 
was thus reversed. This confirms the hypothesis 
that producers underestimated the scale of the 
recession at the end of last year, thereby 
accumulating excess inventories. While the 
cyclical inventory adjustment clearly began at the 
start of the year, it is difficult to say how far it 
still has to go. Manufacturing surveys showed a 
significant decline in inventories in April and 
May but they remain well above their historical 
average, suggesting further cuts in stocks in the 
months to come.  
Green shoots stemming from soft data  
As opposed to hard data, soft data have seen 
green shoots springing up throughout most 
euro-area countries. Most of the latest survey 
indicators point to more encouraging short-term 
economic prospects. The Economic Sentiment 
Indicator (ESI) for the euro area picked up in 
April (for the first time since May 2007) and 
remained on an upward trend in May. While in 
April the rebound occurred on account of 
improved sentiment from industry and 
consumers, the increase in May stemmed mainly 
from a significant improvement in the retail trade 
confidence indicator. The improvement in the 
ESI was broad-based across euro-area countries, 
with the trough being reached by most countries 
in March or a month earlier.  
Similar improvements have been visible in other 
sentiment indicators. The IFO and NBB indexes 
continued to pick up in May, after the trough 
reached in December 2008. At the same time, the 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area II/2009 
 
 
 
- 12 - 
euro-area PMI manufacturing recorded its 
sharpest increase in May since the launch of the 
series in 1997. The rise was broad-based across 
countries, with France, Italy and Spain showing 
PMI readings above pre-Lehman levels. The May 
reading of the PMI also improved for services, 
though more moderately. However, these are 
only 'green shoots' and the PMI manufacturing 
and services readings remain well below the 50 
mark which indicates continued contraction in 
activity. 
Graph 11: GDP growth and the Economic Sentiment 
Indicator (in %, 1996Q2 – 2009Q1)  
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Source: Commission services. 
The pick-up in confidence in the euro area seems 
to have been driven mostly by signs of an 
inflection in the global environment (see below) 
and, possibly, an improvement in the inventory 
situation. However, it is so far mostly confined to 
the expectation parts of the surveys (i.e. 
companies have so far not reported an increase 
of their production) and the magnitude of the 
rebound remains relatively small. The few hard 
data so far available for the beginning of the 
second quarter are, at best, mixed. Both retail 
trade and construction output were somewhat up 
in April, but the series are volatile and remain in 
clear contraction mode on a year-on-year basis. 
More importantly, industrial production dropped 
further in April compared with March and the 
series' year-on-year rate of contraction now 
exceeds 20%. While the recent improvement in 
sentiment in the euro area is encouraging, there is 
still a long way to go from these green shoots to 
a solid recovery. 
Early signs of improvements in the global 
economy  
World trade deteriorated severely in the first 
quarter of 2009, but some signs of stabilisation 
have become noticeable more recently.  
According to estimates by the Netherlands 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, world trade saw a 
sharp decline in the first quarter of this year 
(11.3% q-o-q and 15.1% y-o-y), the largest in the 
history of this series. Among the main 
industrialised economies, Japan suffered a 
dramatic fall in imports, i.e. 16.6% (q-o-q), and 
the US declined by 13.3% (q-o-q). Eurostat 
figures from national accounts also show that 
euro-area trade was not spared and declined 
further, with exports and imports -8.1% and 
-7.2% down q-o-q, respectively, resulting in a 
negative contribution to GDP growth of -0.3 pp. 
No Member State has escaped this contraction in 
trade.2 
Graph 12: World trade and PMI 
(January 1998 to May 2009) 
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(1) y-o-y growth in 3-mma. Data cover the period January 1998 to 
March 2009. 
Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis, 
EcoWin and Bloomberg. 
However, world trade has recently started to 
show some signs of stabilisation. After three 
consecutive months of sharp month-on-month 
contraction, world trade remained broadly flat in 
February and March, thus suggesting that the 
worst might be over. There have also been signs 
of a decrease in the pace of contraction of world 
                                                     
2  The causes of the collapse in world trade and its 
implications for the euro area will be analysed in the next 
issue of the Quarterly Report on the Euro Area. 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 13 - 
trade prices in recent months. Probably more 
significantly, the global PMI manufacturing 
index, which reached its inflection point in 
December 2008, picked up at an unprecedented 
rate in April and May, mostly due to a recovery 
in emerging markets, particularly in Asia and the 
BRICs. The index is now above the level it was at 
last September. 
To what extent the euro area can take full 
advantage of the nascent rebound in world 
activity remains to be seen. So far, the main 
drivers of the rebound appear to be Asian 
emerging markets, which are not the most 
important outlet for euro-area exporters. In 
contrast, the rise in industry confidence has so 
far remained comparatively subdued in many of 
the euro-area's main trading partners. As shown 
in Graph 13, sentiment has not improved any 
more markedly in key trading partners such as 
new EU Member States or the UK than in the 
euro area itself.  
Graph 13: Industrial confidence indicators in euro area 
and its main trading partners 
(in points of standard deviation, Jan. 2005 to May 2009) 
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 (1) Composite index for new EU Member States outside the euro 
area with 2000 GDP weights.  
Source: Commission services. 
The pace of GDP contraction has begun to 
ease but output will not level off before the 
end of the year 
The European Commission's spring 2009 
economic forecast projects euro-area GDP to 
contract by 4% in 2009 as a whole. The quarterly 
pace of contraction will ease significantly as from 
the second quarter but output will not level off 
before the end of the year. The recession will 
affect all Member States to varying degrees, 
depending on the degree of trade openness, their 
exposure to the financial crisis and housing-
market developments. It will also have an adverse 
impact on nearly all demand components, with 
the exception of government consumption and 
public investment. The latter will contribute 
positively to growth in 2009-2010, reflecting in 
part the budgetary stimuli taken within the 
framework of the European Economic Recovery 
Plan.   
The growth outlook for the euro-area economy 
is marked by exceptional uncertainty, however. 
While the ambitious policy initiatives taken by 
governments and central banks since last autumn 
have prevented a systemic financial meltdown, 
financial markets and institutions remain under 
stress. The world economic situation continues 
to be exceptionally uncertain. Risks to the 
forecasts are sizeable and remain somewhat 
skewed to the downside. Of particular concern is 
the possibility that the negative feedback loop, 
from the deteriorating real economy to the still 
fragile financial sector, will intensify (e.g. via 
rising bad loans or cross-border contagion 
effects). This would reinforce the necessary 
deleveraging process, pushing the projected 
recovery in the real economy even further into 
the future. On the positive side, policy measures 
may be more effective than anticipated in 
restoring stability and confidence in financial 
markets, thereby supporting economic activity. 
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2. Assessing the effectiveness of banking 
support measures*  
In October last year, EU Member States 
announced a coordinated effort to design rescue 
packages for their banking systems. As reported 
in past issues of this publication, these packages 
were implemented over the ensuing weeks and 
have provided financial institutions with 
substantial public support, mainly in the form of 
recapitalisation, debt guarantees, asset swaps and 
asset reliefs. While the ECB and other central 
banks implemented measures that foster banks' 
liquidity positions, the government schemes 
target banks' long-term financing needs. 
Recapitalisation measures are meant to boost 
financial institutions' capital base, which has been 
eroded by large write-downs on asset positions. 
State guarantees for bank liabilities in principle 
eliminate counter-party risks and thereby support 
banks' financing on debt markets. Asset relief 
measures target the root of the financial crisis, 
namely to remove uncertainty on the exposure to 
toxic or impaired assets on banks' books. Further 
measures include changes in accounting rules and 
deposit guarantees. The objective of this section 
is to make a first appraisal of the effectiveness of 
these measures. 
While the banking support schemes were 
designed and implemented by individual Member 
States, they were established within a coordinated 
framework at EU level. This was set up through 
(i)  agreement on common principles, most 
prominently with the Paris declaration of Heads 
of State or Government of the euro-area 
countries, (ii) guidance by the European 
Commission and the ECB on the design and 
pricing of the schemes and (iii) the European 
Commission's approval of the schemes and 
individual rescue operations under State aid rules. 
The objectives of these schemes are threefold: 
• to avert the immediate threat to banking-
sector stability that had emerged in particular 
after the bankruptcy of the US investment 
bank Lehman Brothers in mid-September;  
• to promote a return to normal functioning in 
the interbank and other wholesale credit 
markets; and  
* Section prepared by Michael Thiel and Staffan Linden. 
• to underpin lending to the private non-
financial sectors of the economy and thus 
mitigate the effects of any credit supply 
constraints. 
Financial market developments that indicate 
whether or not these objectives are being 
achieved are discussed below. It should be borne 
in mind that these developments are likely also to 
reflect other factors – notably changes in the 
procedures for monetary policy operations, cuts 
in central banks' interest rates and the slump in 
real activity – as well as any effects of the rescue 
packages. 
In this section, policy measures are considered 
effective if conditions on financial markets move 
towards those levels that were considered to be 
normal prior to the financial crisis, which, for the 
purpose at hand, amounts to comparing 
developments in key financial statistics before, 
during and after the financial crisis. However, it 
is important to note that a full return to pre-crisis 
levels is unlikely for at least two reasons. First, 
pre-crisis conditions were extraordinary in terms 
of prevailing perceptions of risks. But risk 
attitudes have considerably changed amid the 
financial crisis and are unlikely to revert to pre-
crisis levels. Second, the economic outlook has 
deteriorated considerably in the meantime. While 
a large share of the deterioration may be 
attributed to the financial crisis, real economic 
activity is certain to have feedback effects on 
financial activity.  
Stabilisation of banks' capital positions and 
their funding via debt markets 
The form of public support, the amounts 
committed and the amounts effectively used 
differ notably across euro-area Member States 
(Table 3). Government-designed support 
measures reflect national differences in (i) the 
relative size of the banking sector, (ii) the relative 
reliance of banks on wholesale funding, (iii) their 
exposure to impaired assets, and (iv) the 
budgetary margins available. Most euro-area 
Member States provided both capital injections 
and state guarantees on bank debt. Spain, 
Slovenia and Finland introduced state guarantees, 
but have not envisaged capital injections, and 
only Cyprus, Malta and Slovakia have not  
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Table 3: Euro-area public interventions in the banking sector  
(in % of GDP, Jun 2008 to Apr 2009) (1) 
 Capital injections 
Guarantees on bank 
liabilities 
Relief of impaired 
asset 
Liquidity and bank 
funding support Total 
 approved effective approved effective approved effective approved effective approved effective 
Austria  5.0  1.7   25.7    5.1 0.4 0.4 1.6 1.5   32.8    8.7 
Belgium  4.2  5.7   70.8  16.3 4.2 4.2 NA NR    79.2   26.2 
Cyprus  0.0  0.0    0.0    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0    0.0    0.0 
Germany  4.2  1.6   18.6    7.1 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0   23.2    9.1 
Greece  2.0  1.5    6.1    1.2 0.0 0.0 3.3 1.8   11.4    4.6 
Spain  0.0  0.0    9.3    3.2 0.0 0.0 2.8 1.8   12.1    5.0 
Finland  0.0  0.0   27.7    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   27.7    0.0 
France  1.2  0.8   16.6    4.5 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0   18.1    5.6 
Ireland  5.1  4.2 225.2 225.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 230.3 229.4 
Italy  1.3  0.0   NA    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0    1.3    0.0 
Luxemburg  6.9  7.9   12.4   NR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   19.3    7.9 
Malta  0.0  0.0    0.0    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0    0.0    0.0 
Netherlands 13.9 13.9   34.3    7.7 3.9 3.9 0.0 7.5   52.2   33.1 
Portugal  2.4  0.0   10.0    3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   12.5    3.3 
Slovenia  0.0  0.4   32.8    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   32.8    0.4 
Slovakia  0.0  0.0    0.0    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0    0.0    0.0 
Euro area  3.0  1.9   20.5    8.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.8   24.6   12.0 
Memo 
EU-27  2.9  1.8   24.6    8.1 0.4 0.4 2.5 2.6   30.5   13.0 
(1) NA - Not available indicates that the amount is not available in the State aid decision. NR - Not reported indicates that the amount was 
not reported by the Member State in its reply to the EFC questionnaire. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
implemented any kind of scheme yet.4  
Changes to banks' capital have become a central 
gauge of financial soundness because banks' 
capital and reserves determine their capability to 
withstand losses. Two main factors are impacting 
on banks’ desired capital ratios. First, asset write-
downs are depleting capital. Second, market 
participants have become more risk-averse and 
expect banks to hold more and higher quality 
capital than required by internationally agreed 
standards. Under the influence of these two 
factors, public capital injections have been 
instrumental in stabilising banks' capital 
positions. Since the third quarter of 2008,5 capital 
injections have been considerably higher than 
write-downs (Graph 14). The outstanding 
amount of capital and reserves of euro-area 
                                                     
4  Some individual operations were carried out outside the 
general schemes. As a result, effective amounts are 
sometimes higher than approved amounts in the table. 
This is, in particular, the case for rescue operations put in 
place before the general scheme was implemented (e.g. in 
the Netherlands and Belgium) or for a specific bank (e.g. 
Landesbanken in Germany). 
5  A comparison is made with the third quarter because 
some large-scale public intervention occurred in 
September before the general schemes were adopted.  
banks, as recorded in the ECB's aggregate 
balance sheet, increased by €74 billion or 4.4% in 
the period from July 2008 to March 2009. Euro-
area Member States raised €128 billion of capital 
from external sources over that period.6  
Graph 14: Bank write-downs and capital raised,  
main euro-area banks (billion EUR, 2007Q3 to 2009Q1) 
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Source: Bloomberg. 
                                                     
6  There are a number of statistical problems with the 
'capital and reserves' position in the aggregated balance 
sheets as published by the ECB, namely,. that (i) the data 
are non-consolidated, (ii) the population of reporting 
banks has changed, and (iii) accounting practices still 
seem to differ across Member States. 
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While public capital injections broadly offset 
capital losses for the euro area as a whole, 
differences across Member States are quite 
marked. Although fully comparable data are not 
available on changes to bank capital and public 
capital injections, a comparison of the bars in 
Graph 15 suggests that Member States that are 
heavily engaged in public capital injections are 
the ones where banks were over-proportionally 
affected by the financial crisis. Bank capital 
deteriorated significantly in Belgium and the 
Netherlands, countries where governments have 
also intervened actively with capital injections. 
Germany and Austria provided capital to selected 
banks, which seems to have prevented capital 
erosion in both countries. Conversely, bank 
capital positions improved in a number of 
Member States that did not inject public capital, 
e.g. in Spain where bank capital was 13% higher 
in March than six months earlier and in Slovakia 
where the corresponding figure was 9%. 
Graph 15: Capital increases and public capital 
injections in selected Member States  
(2008Q3 to 2009Q1, billion EUR) 
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(1) Changes in capital and reserves on the liability side of balance 
sheets (unconsolidated aggregate balance sheets of monetary 
financial institutions in the euro area). 
(2) Information on public capital injections is from Member States.  
Sources: ECB, Commission services based on information from 
Member States. 
As the crisis has progressed, bank funding has 
become increasingly difficult, especially as 
regards interbank lending and the issuance of 
debt securities.7 Although the issuance of debt is 
                                                     
7  The quantitatively most important item on banks' liability 
side are deposits, including deposits from non-banks. 
Deposits from non-banks increased throughout the crisis 
period in the euro-area and all its Member States bar 
Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
no substitute for bank capital, it can play an 
important role in securing banks' funding. Net 
issuance of euro-area banks' debt securities 
turned drastically negative in the run-up to the 
peak of the financial crisis, being minus 
€29 billion in September and minus €23 billion in 
October 2008 in seasonally-adjusted terms. This 
compares to a monthly average of plus 
€24 billion since the start of the euro and €36 
billion between January 2006 and July 2008. 
State guarantees on securities issuance by banks 
have accordingly been a significant bank support 
measure in all Member States that implemented 
banking support schemes. It can be seen from 
Table 3 that take-up rates for state guarantees, 
defined as amounts effectively used relative to 
total amounts committed, are lower than for 
recapitalisation. In early May, they varied 
between 30% or more in Germany, Spain and 
France and zero in Italy and Finland.  
Graph 16: Issuance of state-guaranteed debt securities 
by euro-area banks  
(securities in euro with maturity above 1 year, billion EUR, 
Oct. 2008 to Mar 2009) 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09
State guaranteed Other long-term issues by MFI in EUR  
Sources: Bloomberg, ECB. 
Actual banks' issuance of state-guaranteed bonds 
gained pace in early January 2009, after 
traditionally low issuance activity in December. 
In the ECFIN database, which collects euro 
issuances of maturities above 1 year, the share of 
state-guaranteed bonds in all issuances of debt 
bonds by EU banks has steadily increased (see 
Graph 16). However, issuance of covered and 
unsecured bonds followed the same time profile. 
This suggests that state-guaranteed debt did not 
necessarily crowd out other forms of debt 
securities. Issuance of different forms of banks' 
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debt might actually be determined by common 
factors.  
Since debt securities are often issued to roll over 
existing debt, gross issuance has to be considered 
in relation to redemptions. The difference 
between the two, net issuance, turned from 
minus €26 billion on average in 
September/October 2008 to an average of 
around €28 billion per month from November to 
April, i.e. broadly back to the pre-crisis averages 
of €36 billion. In the ECB's latest Bank Lending 
Survey, banks indicated that their access to 
wholesale funding had eased in response to 
governments’ announcements of recapitalisations 
and guarantees. However, access to wholesale 
funding was still perceived to be persistently 
hampered, except for the case of very short-term 
funding. 
Money market prices signal a gradual return 
to more normal market functioning… 
The most immediate and visible effect of the 
financial crisis has been on the functioning of 
wholesale credit markets and, in particular, the 
interbank market. As the crisis progressed, 
liquidity in the interbank markets dried up and 
interest rates rose sharply compared with the 
corresponding rates for secured lending. A 
regime shift has taken place, marked by 
significant market intervention by central banks. 
Central banks have assumed the role of 
intermediaries in the market, providing banks 
with liquidity as needed and absorbing excess 
liquidity via their deposit facilities. This 
arrangement has ensured liquidity in the banking 
system and facilitated the distribution of credit to 
the real economy, but the market is far from 
functioning normally.  
Graph 17 shows the spreads between unsecured 
short-term interbank lending and swap 
transactions, which have become widely used 
indicators of money market distress. These 
spreads peaked in October 2008 and have fallen 
since, with only a brief interruption in February. 
Although current spreads are still far from their 
pre-crisis levels, the normalisation process is 
continuing. Currently, spreads have returned to 
levels comparable to those observed during the 
initial stages of the crisis, i.e. before the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers,  implying a 
reduction of about 70% from their peak. 
Graph 17: Interest rate spreads,  
(Euribor/Libor over swap rates in percentage points, Jul 
2007 to Apr 2009) 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09
Euro area
UK
USA
 
Sources: Bloomberg, ECB. 
The lower interbank interest spreads reflect a 
decline in counterparty risk, which was the initial 
cause of the increasing spreads. There is, 
however, very little information on turnover on 
the money market, and it is therefore difficult to 
assess to what extent the improved spreads 
actually imply a normalisation of markets. Albeit 
much less than at the beginning of the year, the 
ECB deposit facility and liquidity provision are 
still used intensively, suggesting some remaining 
reluctance of banks to fully interact with each 
other. 
Banks' aggregated balance sheet data indicate a 
sharp deterioration in intra-area cross-border 
interbank activity since autumn 2008.8 Interbank 
deposits between domestic banks increased in 
most Member States, while the flow of cross-
border interbank deposits slowed appreciably 
(Graph 18). Furthermore, cross-border deposits 
from other euro-area Member States have slowed 
more markedly than cross-border deposits from 
other countries. 
There are some signs of a systematic link 
between a decline in interbank deposit and loans 
and the availability of bank support measures. In 
                                                     
8  For euro-area Member States and some items, a 
breakdown is available for domestic, other euro-area 
Member States, EU Member States outside the euro area 
and extra-EU. 
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Graph 18, Member States are presented from left 
to right in descending order in terms of the size 
of their support measures. Member States that 
have implemented the most generous measures 
(in terms of GDP) were also the ones that saw 
the biggest deterioration in their banks' interbank 
deposits during the final quarter of 2008, 
suggesting that the measures were tailored to 
meeting the scale of the problems in market 
functioning. 
Graph 18: Interbank deposits in euro-area Member 
States (contributions to quarterly growth rate in %,  
2008Q3 to 2009Q1) 
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Source: ECB. 
… as do spreads and prices on other 
financial markets 
Other financial market prices have broadly 
shadowed the time profile of interbank interest 
rate spreads, signalling a gradual decline in risk 
aversion and in counterparty risk, plus a tentative 
recovery in expectations as regards banks' 
profitability. Thus, the trend towards more 
normal functioning has not been limited to 
money markets; it also stretches to the financial 
sector in general. 
Indicators of default risk have improved 
substantially since October 2008, especially for 
subordinated debt. Default risks remain, 
however, at elevated levels compared to pre-crisis 
levels (see Graph 19). The striking hike in early 
March can be attributed to the announcement by 
the US government of stress tests for 19 of the 
major US banks. Following the announcement, 
CDS spreads shot up as uncertainty increased, 
both regarding the state of the banking system 
and the way in which results would be used and 
published. The increase was stronger in the USA, 
but also CDS spreads for euro-area banks were 
affected. As the stress test procedures became 
clearer, the market situation slowly improved, 
most notably in the euro area. When the results 
of the US stress tests were published at the 
beginning of May, CDS spreads fell immediately 
and seem to be on a firm downward trend. 
Lower CDS spreads indicate an easing of 
investor concerns about possible default and 
poor earning prospects. 
Graph 19: CDS spreads of different financial 
instruments, euro area (bp, Jan 2007 to Apr 2009) 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09
iTraxx Europe
Senior Financials
Subordinated Financials
 
Source: EcoWin. 
The price of bank equity has seen a strong 
rebound since mid-March, with higher valuations 
on the back of unexpectedly good earning 
reports. Despite the strong recovery, bank stocks 
still have more ground to make up before 
catching up with the general Eurostoxx stock 
index. In little more than two years, bank stocks 
lost 20% of their value relative to other shares. 
The recent hike in banks’ share prices signals 
market expectations of improving profitability 
and higher earnings. 
Share prices have also been helped by reduced 
market risk, which has given investors more 
confidence and increased their appetite for risk. 
Implied volatility of the Eurostoxx index, which 
had increased substantially in the period around 
mid-October 2008, has declined since then. 
Convergence towards the pre-crisis level 
continues, and currently volatility is 
approximately 40% above normal market 
conditions. At its peak, implied volatility was 
almost 250% above its long-term average. 
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Graph 20: Relative share prices of financials, euro area 
(Jan 2007 to Apr 2009)  
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(1) Index Jan 2007 =0. 
(2) Derived from option prices. 
Source: EcoWin. 
Lending decelerated amid weaker demand 
and higher financing costs 
Ultimately, the bank support schemes aim to 
cushion the impact of the financial crisis on the 
real economy. Bank lending is an important 
transmission variable through which instability in 
financial markets affects economic activity. This 
is particularly true in the euro area where bank 
credit is the most important source of external 
financing for households and non-financial 
corporations alike.9 Gauging the impact of bank 
support measures on bank lending is not 
straightforward, however, because lending is also 
affect by other factors. The most important one 
is the deteriorating economic outlook, which can 
be expected to (i) boost demand for loans in the 
short term as firms experience shortfalls in 
revenues, which need to be offset by using 
agreed credit lines, and (ii) reduce demand for 
loans in the medium term because firms scale 
down investment. 
Bank lending to non-financial corporations 
decelerated considerably in the course of the 
financial crisis. Even by the end of 2008, credit 
growth had reached very high double-digit rates. 
Since then, annual growth rates had decelerated 
to 5.2% in April 2009. Bank lending to 
households, most of which is for house 
                                                     
9  For the weights of different financial instruments in the 
euro area, see Box 4 in QREA IV/2008. 
purchases, has been decelerating for more than 
two years. The pace of deceleration picked up 
significantly during the final months of 2008.  
Graph 21: Bank lending to the private economy, euro 
area (y-o-y growth in %, Jan 2004 to Apr 2009) 
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Source: ECB. 
The ECB's bank lending survey gives some 
indication of the factors underlying the 
tightening in credit standards. Banks' replies to 
the questionnaire reveal the following:  
• The tightening of credit conditions has 
primarily taken the form of an increase of 
margins on risky loans and average loans. 
Only a minority of banks have reduced the 
size of their loans or credit lines or increased 
their collateral requirements. Thus, credit has 
primarily become more expensive rather 
than being rationed. 
• The macroeconomic outlook and industry or 
firm-specific considerations have led to the 
tightening of conditions. A smaller but 
increasing number of banks report that their 
costs and their ability to access market 
financing (in other words supply factors) 
have been factors affecting the tightening 
(double quoting was possible). That is, 
demand factors have clearly prevailed over 
supply side factors, although the latter have 
mattered more than in the past. 
A notable observation is that most of the 
Member States that have experienced sharp 
declines in bank lending have also implemented 
bank support measures. This is particularly 
apparent in Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg and 
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the Netherlands, where lending to the private 
economy contracted considerably. In Germany, 
Spain, France, Italy, Austria and Finland, on the 
other hand, lending has held up relatively well 
since October 2008. Over the period from 
October 2008 to April 2009, Greece recorded a 
notable decline in lending, while lending 
continued to grow in the three countries that 
abstained from public support measures (Cyprus, 
Malta, Slovakia) and in Portugal and Slovenia.  
Graph 22: Bank lending to the private economy, euro-
area Member States (SA, October 2008 = 100) 
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Source: ECB. 
Further balance sheet adjustment will be 
needed  
The sizeable financial rescue packages put in 
place by euro-area Member States have provided 
financial institutions with substantial public 
resources and contributed to prevent a financial 
meltdown. However, bank balance sheets are still 
fragile and the process of balance sheet 
adjustment in the euro-area banking sector is not 
over yet for two reasons.  
• First, substantial bank losses are still likely to 
come as the negative feedback loop from the 
real economy continue to weigh on banks' 
loans and other assets. According to recent 
ECB calculations, euro-area banks may face 
cumulative total losses of €214 billion by 
2010.10  
• Second, the financial crisis entails substantial 
pressure on banks to deleverage, i.e. to 
reduce the ratio of bank assets to capital. 
                                                     
                                                     
10  ECB (2009), 'Financial Stability Review', June. 
There are signs that some adjustment already 
occurred through the reduction of foreign 
assets but more is still to come. Capital-asset 
ratios, which are key indicators of banks' 
leverage, fell in about half of the euro-area 
Member States since June 2008. In most of 
the Member States with large-scale public 
intervention in the banking sector, total 
capital asset ratios are still below the euro-
area average,11 suggesting that the expected 
continuation of the deleveraging process 
might be more pronounced in these Member 
States. 
Conclusions 
Governments throughout the world have taken 
measures on an unprecedented scale and 
continue to support the banking system to ensure 
that there is no return to the meltdown scenario 
faced in October 2008. There are some 
tentatively encouraging signs of improvement in 
various financial market indicators, although the 
high level of risk premiums in many financial 
markets cautions against excessive complacency.  
Overall, the most acute phase of the crisis in the 
banking sector has now receded, but the situation 
remains fragile. Euro-area banks are still highly 
leveraged and persistent concerns about the 
quality of their assets have fuelled fears about the 
overall health of their balance sheets. Additional 
problems for banks have emerged as the financial 
crisis has extended to the real economy. The 
operating environment for banks is likely to 
remain challenging, in particular in respect of 
credit losses linked to their loan portfolios. 
11  This concerns the outstanding amounts of total assets to 
total capital as recorded in the aggregated balance sheet 
(these data are subject to similar statistical problems as 
those mentioned in footnote 3). Regulators focus on 
different aggregates, for example risk-adjusted assets. 
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economy in 2009 with respect to the 2008 
baseline, can account on average for about two 
thirds for the automatic reaction of the budgets 
to economic growth via the tax system and the 
structure of expenditure (automatic stabilisers) 
and one third for the fiscal stimulus measures 
adopted by Member States,  in line with the 
European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) 
endorsed by the European Council in December 
2008. The EERP calls for discretionary fiscal 
support equivalent to 1.5% of GDP, of which 
1.2% of GDP at Member States level. Overall, 
Member States have adopted or announced fiscal 
stimulus measures totalling 1.8% of GDP over 
2009-2010, of which 1.1% in 2009. Of the total, 
1% of GDP is on the revenue and 0.8% of GDP 
on the expenditure side. The fiscal support 
packages adopted under the EERP have broadly 
followed the "three T principles" for effective 
fiscal stimulus (timely, temporary and targeted), 
in addition to the need for a coordinated 
approach taking into account country differences 
in fiscal room for manoeuvre. The stimulus 
measures are forecast to improve real GDP 
growth in 2009 by about ¾% relative to the 
baseline. 
3. A mid-year review of budgetary policy 
in the euro area* 
This section reviews recent developments in 
budgetary policy in euro-area Member States and 
assesses the prospects for 2009-10. It also 
discusses the challenges ahead, particularly in 
terms of debt sustainability.  
A sudden and sharp turnaround in budgetary 
developments in 2008  
Reversing the decline under way since 2004, the 
euro-area general government deficit increased 
by 1.3 pp of GDP in 2008, to 1.9% of GDP. 
With output gaps overall decreasing, although 
estimated to have remained still largely in 
positive territory, the average structural deficit 
rose in 2008 by around 1 pp of GDP in the euro 
area, thus returning to the 2005 level of 2¾% of 
GDP.  
The worsening of nominal balances in 2008 was 
noticeable across a vast majority of Member 
States (see Table 4).  Comparing the 2008 
outcomes with the plans for 2008 in the 2007 
updates of the Member States' Stability 
Programmes shows that lower-than-projected 
nominal GDP growth plays a substantial role in 
explaining the overall worse-than-planned 
budgetary outcomes in 2008 (see Box 1). 
Graph 23: Fiscal stance in euro-area Member States in 
2009 (% of GDP) 
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Fiscal policy steps in to support the economy 
in 2009 and 2010 
With the output gap estimated to fall by almost 
5 pp of potential GDP – a one-year decrease 
higher than the one recorded in 1975 in the 
aftermath of the first oil shock – the aggregate 
government deficit in the euro area is projected 
to rise by 3.4 pp in 2009, to 5.3% of GDP. 
According to the Commission’s spring 2009 
forecast, in 2009 the government deficits would 
exceed the 3% of GDP threshold in the Treaty in 
nearly all Member States. 
(1) Change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance.  
Source: Commission services. 
Turning to the fiscal policy stance in individual 
Member States, nearly all euro-area countries 
have responded to falling aggregate demand by 
counter-cyclical loosening in 2009 (Graph 23). 
However, some significant exceptions exists 
which appear, at least in part, to be linked to the 
countries' external and internal imbalances and 
The change in the nominal balances in 2009 in 
the Commission’s spring 2009 forecast, i.e. the 
estimated fiscal support provided to the 
* Section prepared by Lucia Piana.  
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the related ability to expand without facing 
adverse market reactions (Graph 24). 
Graph 24: Government and external balances in 2008, 
euro-area Member States (% of GDP) 
 
PT
NL
AT
BE
DE
IE
EL
ES
FR IT
CY
LU
SI
FI
SK
MT
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
Government balance (% of GDP)
Ex
ter
na
l b
ala
nc
e(%
 of
 G
DP
)
More room for fiscal 
manoeuvre
Less room for fiscal 
manoeuvre
 
Source: Commission services. 
According to the Commission’s Spring 2009 
Forecast, on the basis of an unchanged policy 
scenario government balances in the euro area 
would deteriorate by a further 1.2% of GDP in 
2010, to 6.5% of GDP (Table 4). While the 
output gap will widen by a further ¾ pp to an 
unprecedented 3½% of potential GDP, the 
primary balance will continue to worsen in 2010, 
including in cyclically-adjusted terms, by ½ pp of 
GDP on average in the euro area (see Graph 25). 
A further increase in 2010 in the fiscal support 
provided by stimulus measures is envisaged in 
some countries with more room for fiscal 
manoeuvre. However, the level of support 
provided by fiscal stimulus measures is expected 
to decline overall by 0.3% of GDP in the euro 
area in 2010 with respect to 2009.13 Withdrawal 
would concern, on average, measures on the 
expenditure side, while the stimulus measures on 
the revenue side would remain broadly constant 
at the 2009 level. 
These budgetary projections are subject to the 
risks attached to the central macroeconomic 
scenario in the Commission’s Spring 2009 
Forecast.  In an environment marked by 
                                                     
13  Besides possible expansionary measures adopted before 
the stimulus packages, the discrepancy between the 
partial withdrawal of support and the further 
deterioration of the average cyclically-adjusted primary 
balance reflects features specifically pertaining to the 
calculation of the cyclically-adjusted balance. Taking 
sharply declining potential output growth as the 
benchmark for cyclically-neutral developments in 
revenues and expenditures implies that an increase in 
(non-cyclical) expenditure in line with pre-slowdown 
estimates of growth will result in a deterioration of the 
cyclically-adjusted balance, even in the absence of 
specific expenditure-raising measures. Furthermore, the 
methodology uses standard constant (long-run) tax 
elasticities for calculating the reaction of tax revenues to 
changes in the output gap, while, as shown in Box 1, 
elasticities have been dropping sharply. 
Table 4: Recent and projected economic and budgetary developments in the euro area 
(y-o-y % change and % of GDP) (1) 
 Real GDP % Growth Government balance % GDP 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 
BE  2.8  1.1 -3.5 -0.2 -0.2 -1.2 -4.5  -6.1 
DE  2.5  1.3 -5.4  0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -3.9  -5.9 
IE  6.0 -2.3 -9.0 -2.6  0.2 -7.1 -12.0 -15.6 
EL  4.0  2.9 -0.9  0.1 -3.6 -5.0 -5.1  -5.7 
ES  3.7  1.2 -3.2 -1.0  2.2 -3.8 -8.6  -9.8 
FR  2.3  0.4 -3.0 -0.2 -2.7 -3.4 -6.6  -7.0 
IT  1.6 -1.0 -4.4  0.1 -1.5 -2.7 -4.5  -4.8 
CY  4.4  3.7  0.3  0.7  3.4  0.9 -1.9  -2.6 
LU  5.2 -0.9 -3.0  0.1  3.6  2.6 -1.5  -2.8 
MT  3.9  2.7 -0.9  0.2 -2.2 -4.7 -3.6  -3.2 
NL  3.5  2.1 -3.5 -0.4  0.3  1.0 -3.4  -6.1 
AT  3.1  1.8 -4.0 -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -4.2  -5.3 
PT  1.9  0.0 -3.7 -0.8 -2.6 -2.6 -6.5  -6.7 
SI  6.8  3.5 -3.4  0.7  0.5 -0.9 -5.5  -6.5 
SK 10.4  6.4 -2.6  0.7 -1.9 -2.2 -4.7  -5.4 
FI   4.2  0.9 -4.7  0.2  5.2  4.2 -0.8  -2.9 
EA  2.7  0.7 -4.0 -0.1 -0.6 -1.9 -5.3  -6.5 
(1) Projections for 2010 are based on a no policy change assumption. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Box 1: Budgetary implementation in 2008 
 
The graph below provides an illustration of the reasons for the discrepancy between the government balance 
planned for 2008 in the 2007 Stability Programme updates and the actual government balance observed. It 
decomposes the difference between the 2008 outturn for the general government deficit (as a percentage of GDP) in 
Eurostat news release No 56/2009 of 22 April 2009 and the figure targeted in the 2007 updates of the Stability 
Programmes into a base effect, a nominal GDP growth effect and revenue/expenditure growth effects. The base 
effect reflects the part of the difference that is due to the actual outcome for 2007 as a percentage of GDP being 
different from what was estimated in the 2007 updates of the programmes. The nominal GDP growth effect is the 
part of the difference that relates to the current GDP growth estimates for 2008 turning out to be higher or lower 
than anticipated in the 2007 updates of the programmes and therefore reducing/increasing the denominator of the 
expenditure ratio. The effect of the change in the nominal expenditure with respect to plans captures the part of the 
difference related to the annual growth rate of expenditure in 2008 turning out to be higher or lower than targeted in 
the 2007 updates of the programmes over and above the difference explained by the difference in planned versus 
actual GDP growth. Finally, revenue surprises reflect revenue-to-GDP ratio turning out different from planned in 
the 2007 updates.  
 
Sources of differences in 2008 government balances 
between the 2007 updates of the SP and the actual 
outturn (% of GDP) (1) 
Apparent tax elasticity, euro area (1) 
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(1) Countries are ranked from left to right on the basis of the 2008 
budget balance outturn;  the figure in the square brackets gives the 
difference between the outturn of the budget balance in 2008 and the 
planned budget balance in the 2007 programme update. 
Source: Commission services. 
(1) Ratio of percentage change of tax revenues to percentage change 
in GDP.  
Source: Commission services. 
 
For the euro area as a whole, the 1% of GDP higher deficit than planned in the 2007/2008 updates of the Stability 
Programmes reflects (see left panel of graph): (i) the negative impact of 0.6% of GDP due to the lower-than-
expected nominal GDP growth; (ii) a 0.4% of GDP negative surprise from revenue (which comes on top of the 
decrease in revenue estimated from the lower economic growth); and (iii) 0.2% of GDP higher-than-expected 
expenditure; only slightly offset by (iv) a positive 0.2% of GDP base effect from outturns of the budget balances 
better-than-estimated in the 2007 updates. 
The negative surprise from revenue occurred as the decline in tax elasticities from the highs recorded in the previous 
three years turned out to be even more pronounced than the one already factored into the 2007 updates of the 
Stability Programmes (see right panel of graph). Tax revenues and tax elasticities can experience substantial variations 
during turning points of the business cycle, as some items, such as corporate and property taxes, are particularly 
volatile. Events such as systemic financial crisis can exacerbate these trends.  
exceptional uncertainty, risks to the growth 
outlook are sizeable and remain somewhat tilted 
to the downside for 2009, but look more 
balanced for 2010. Of particular concern is the 
possibility that the feedback loop from the 
deteriorating real economy to the still fragile 
financial sector may intensify. However, 
developments in financial markets and economic 
indicators up to the beginning of June 2009 seem 
to suggest that this threat is receding. 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area II/2009
 
 
 
- 24 - 
Graph 25: Fiscal stance in euro-area Member States in 
2010 (% of GDP) 
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(1) Change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance.  
Source: Commission services. Change in the cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance (CAPB) from 2010 to 2009. 
Debt developments and sustainability gaps 
The government debt-to-GDP ratio, which is a 
fundamental determinant of the ability to 
conduct countercyclical policy, already started to 
worsen in the vast majority of Member States in 
2008 and is projected to continue worsening in 
2009 and 2010 in all euro-area Member States 
(Table 5), due to expected deterioration in 
primary balances and low nominal GDP growth 
(negative in 2009). Debt increases are also driven 
by sizeable stock-flow adjustments, which 
capture debt increases unrelated to fiscal deficit, 
including accumulation of financial assets, 
valuation effects, differences in cash and accrual 
accounting and other residual effects. More 
specifically, stock-flow adjustments in 2008 
amount to 3.5% of GDP and an additional 1.2% 
of GDP is included in the projection for the 
average 2009 debt ratio of the euro area. Only 
parts of the stock-flow adjustment relate to 
capital injections into banks. At this stage, only 
an average 0.5% of GDP stock-flow adjustment 
is included in the debt projections for 2010. 
Additional operations to support financial market 
functioning with positive stock-flow adjustment 
would further raise debt projections. 
Further rising debt ratios in the years beyond 
2010 can be expected. The current high deficit 
levels can indeed be partly seen as structural in 
the sense that the economy is likely to face a 
deceleration in its medium- to long-term growth 
prospects. In fact, the crisis is the equivalent of 
capital destruction, reducing - at least for a time - 
the productive potential of the economy. Labour 
market frictions imply an accompanying rise in 
the equilibrium rate of unemployment. Current 
market disruption in financial markets and the 
more heavily regulated environment that is likely 
to follow can also be expected to have a 
permanent negative effect on potential growth, 
e.g. through reduced availability of capital for 
R&D and innovation activities.14  
Graph 26: Sustainability gaps – 2010 scenario  
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Source: Commission services. 
These developments have implications for the 
long-term sustainability of public finances. The 
sustainability gap (S2 indicator) presented in 
Graph 26 shows the size of the permanent 
budgetary adjustment required to meet the 
intertemporal budget constraint, assuming that 
the budgetary position stays at the 2010 levels 
projected in the Commission’s spring 2009 
forecast.15 
                                                     
14  See Focus Section on 'The impact of the economic and 
financial crisis on potential growth' in this report.  
15  There is no agreed definition of what constitutes a 
sustainable position for public finances. A possible 
definition is based on the idea that the debt-to-GDP ratio 
remains bounded at any time in the future and does not 
follow an explosive path. In that case, the discounted 
value of future structural primary balances should cover 
the current level of debt. This condition is referred to as 
the intertemporal budget constraint. The S2 indicator is 
thus the change in the structural primary balance for 
every future year that ensures that the intertemporal 
budget constraint is met. The formal derivation of S2 is 
presented in European Commission (2006), 'The long 
term sustainability of public finances in the European 
Union', European Economy No 4/2006 (Brussels: 
European Commission). 
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Table 5: Debt developments, euro area  
(% of GDP) 
 Gross debt ratio (1) Contributions to change in the ratio between 2007 - 2010 (2) 
Snowball effect Stock-flow adjustment 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 
Change 
in the 
ratio  
2007–10 
Primary 
balance Total Interest exp. 
Nominal 
growth 
effect 
Total Cap. injections
BE  84.0  89.6  95.7 100.9  17.0  0.1  9.5 11.7 -2.2  7.3 5.7 
DE  65.1  65.9  73.4  78.7  13.6  1.3  9.1  8.7  0.4  3.2 1.6 
IE  25.0  43.2  61.2  79.7  54.7 28.3 13.9  6.5  7.4 12.5 2.1 
EL  94.8  97.6 103.4 108.0  13.2 2.1  4.3 13.8 -9.5  6.9 1.2 
ES  36.2  39.5  50.8  62.3  26.1 17.0  4.0  5.1 -1.1  5.0 0.0 
FR  63.8  68.0  79.7  86.0  22.2  8.3  7.1  8.7 -1.6  6.7 0.8 
IT 103.5 105.8 113.0 116.1  12.6 -2.7 13.6 14.6 -1.0  1.6 0.0 
CY  59.4  49.1  47.5  47.9 -11.5 -3.8 -1.3  7.4 -8.7 -6.3 0.0 
LU   6.9  14.7  16.0  16.4   9.5  0.3  1.3  1.5 -0.2  7.9 7.9 
MT  62.1  64.1  67.0  68.9   6.8  1.2  5.7 10.3 -4.6 -0.1 0.0 
NL  45.6  58.2  57.0  63.1  17.4  1.0  6.2  7.5 -1.4 10.2 7.9 
AT  59.4  62.5  70.4  75.2  15.7  1.1  7.4  8.8 -1.3  7.1 1.7 
PT  63.5  66.4  75.4  81.5  17.9  6.6  8.3  9.1 -0.8  2.9 0.0 
SI  23.4  22.8  29.3  34.9  11.5  8.4  2.4  4.5 -2.1  0.7 0.0 
SK  29.4  27.6  32.2  36.3   7.0  8.3 -0.2  3.9 -4.1 -1.1 0.0 
FI   35.1  33.4  39.7  45.7  10.6 -4.7  3.2  4.1 -0.9 12.0 0.0 
EA  66.0  69.3  77.7  83.8  17.8  4.5  8.2  9.2 -1.0  5.1 1.4 
 (1) End of period. (2) The change in the gross debt ratio can be decomposed as follows: 
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where t is a time subscript; D, PD, Y and SF are the stock of government debt, the primary deficit, nominal GDP and the stock-flow 
adjustment respectively, and i and y represent the average cost of debt and nominal GDP growth. The term in parentheses represents the 
“snow-ball” effect. The stock-flow adjustment includes differences in cash and accrual accounting, accumulation of financial assets and 
valuation and other residual effects. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
In the euro area as a whole, the sustainability gap 
based on the '2010 scenario' would reach 6.4% of 
GDP. The deterioration vis-à-vis the 
sustainability gap estimated on the basis of the 
2007 scenario in the 2007 updates of the Stability 
Programme, i.e. before the intensification of the 
crisis, amounts to about 4 pp of GDP. The 
deterioration has to be ascribed to the substantial 
worsening of the starting budgetary positions. 
Fiscal policy challenges ahead 
Looking ahead, budgetary policies need to 
balance stabilisation and sustainability 
considerations. On the one hand, fiscal policy 
should help to stabilise output and avoid risking 
self-reinforcing adverse growth dynamics. On the 
other hand, unsustainable debt and deficit 
developments could become a drag on growth, 
both in the short and in the long run. While in 
2009, the balance tilts towards strongly 
expansionary fiscal policy, it changes in 2010 and 
beyond, gradually calling for increasing budgetary 
caution while avoiding excessively tight 
budgetary policies choking the nascent recovery.  
The pace of consolidation would probably have 
to be differentiated across countries, based on 
considerations of fiscal room for manoeuvre, 
including both narrow (debt, deficit) and broad 
(external position, banking sector) indicators of 
the need for adjustment. Consolidation efforts 
should also reflect the structural nature of the 
economic and financial shock, which implies that 
budgetary developments are also of a structural 
nature. Accordingly, budgetary policy needs to 
adjust to lower growth rates. 
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Focus 
II. The impact of the economic and financial crisis on  
potential growth* 
This focus section analyses the consequences of the ongoing economic and financial crisis on potential output and growth and 
assesses the policy implications. Financial crises can impact potential output via their effect on labour input and productivity. 
Looking back, available historical evidence shows that financial crises are deeper and last longer than other recessions. They 
also tend to have a permanent negative effect on the level of output, shifting the economy down to a lower expansion path. 
Available evidence on the impact of financial crises on long-term growth is mixed but a closer look at a broader sample of 
crises, including non-financial recessions, points to a substantial risk of a TFP-driven drop in potential growth after 
recessions. Projections of the Output Gap Working Group up to 2010 and medium-term Quest simulations suggest that the 
most likely scenario is that the current crisis will lead to a sharp drop in euro-area potential growth in the short term, followed 
by a slow return to pre-crisis potential growth. However, risks of a more permanent downshift in potential growth should not 
be ruled out. To contain the permanent losses in the level of potential output traditionally associated with financial crises and 
to reduce the risks of a lasting deceleration of TFP growth, timely and appropriate policy responses – encompassing a wide 
range of measures and covering several reform areas – need to be put in place. Moreover, policy mistakes, albeit politically 
tempting, must be avoided at all costs (i.e. protectionist policies undermining the Single Market, measures reducing labour 
supply, and unsustainable public finances).  
This first Focus Section assesses the possible 
consequences of the ongoing economic and 
financial crisis on potential output in the euro 
area. Section 1 discusses the main channels 
through which financial crises tend to affect 
potential output. Section 2 reviews the available 
empirical evidence on the effect of past crises. 
Based on this evidence, Section 3 discusses the 
likely impact of the current turmoil on short to 
long-term prospects for potential output in the 
euro area. Section 4 outlines a number of policy 
implications.  
1.  Tracing the transmission channels of 
the crisis on potential output  
A thorough understanding of the impact of the 
crisis on potential output and its growth requires 
an analysis of its individual components, 
productivity and labour. 
Financial crises are likely to affect 
productivity growth in the short to medium 
run, but also in the long run … 
The two components of productivity, namely 
capital accumulation and Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP), might be affected by the 
* Section prepared by Laura González Cabanillas, 
Kieran McMorrow and Gilles Mourre. 
crisis. A crisis can reduce potential output growth 
in the short and medium term through its adverse 
impact on investment. The negative effect of the 
ensuing slower capital accumulation can be 
combined with the impact of accelerating 
obsolescence of some capital vintages due to 
economic restructuring.  
A slow process of industrial restructuring, caused 
either by credit constraints – due to delayed 
adjustments in the banking sector – or by 
entrenched structural rigidities, can also hurt the 
level and growth rate of TFP in the medium to long 
term by locking resources in (relatively) 
unproductive activities.  
TFP growth in the medium and long run could also 
be curtailed by depressed investments in private 
R&D, which are markedly pro-cyclical. TFP 
drivers, such as physical investment, R&D and 
innovation, may suffer further from a prolonged 
recession and the changes in attitudes towards 
risk leading to the tightening of credit conditions 
and the rise in capital cost.  
…while labour input growth would also be 
hit but in the short to medium run only  
A short recession should not affect the pace of 
growth of the labour force, leaving potential 
growth unharmed in the longer run. However, a 
long and deep recession may cut the level of the 
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labour force by discouraging some workers from 
seeking jobs and by reducing migration flows. 
Moreover, pressures to implement policies that 
curtail labour market participation (e.g. early 
retirement, curbs on migration flows) may 
increase.  
Structural unemployment (i.e. the non-
accelerating inflation unemployment rate or 
NAIRU) will increase in the short to medium run 
as a result of a financial crisis. Given the frictions 
in the labour market and long adjustment lags, 
the rise in actual unemployment brought about 
by the sharp contraction of activity in some 
sectors will lead to a temporary rise in the 
NAIRU. Other things remaining equal, the 
NAIRU should return to its original level when 
the sectoral reallocation of labour is completed, 
which is likely to take some time.  
Some factors could lead to a more lasting 
increase in the NAIRU. This would be the case, 
for example, if short-term policy measures taken 
to limit the welfare damages of the crisis – e.g. 
temporary increase in unemployment benefits – 
are not reversed in time. Equally, a durable 
increase in capital costs, arising from the changes 
in attitudes towards risk brought about by the 
financial turmoil, could raise the NAIRU 
permanently as firms would increase their mark-
up to recoup the higher cost of capital.  
Finally, in the case of a prolonged recession, long 
unemployment spells may cause a permanent 
destruction in human capital, leading to an 
irreversible rise in the NAIRU (the so-called 
'hysteresis effect') and further losses in potential 
output level. Although the rise in NAIRU 
reduces the potential output level (via lower 
potential output growth in the short to medium 
run), it is not likely to affect the long-term path 
of potential growth, since this would mean, 
implausibly, that it will rise for ever.  
Distinguishing between level and growth 
effects  
A useful conceptual distinction can be made 
between the effects of financial crises on the 
level and the growth of potential output. Deep 
financial crises tend to have a negative short-term 
effect on potential output due to their cyclical 
effect on capital accumulation and the NAIRU. 
Three medium to long-term scenarios are then 
possible.  
Graph 27. Three possible theoretical cases 
Case No 1: Loss in potential output level entirely 
recouped after some time 
 
Slope = long-term potential 
growth 
No loss in potential 
output level after some 
time
Potential output level
 
Case No 2: No change in long-run potential growth but 
permanent shift in potential output level (permanent loss in 
output level compared with pre-crisis regime) 
 
Same long-term potential growth 
after the crisis (same slope)
Potential output level
Years
Permanent loss 
in potential 
output level 
 
Case No 3: Downward shift in potential growth in the 
long run (output loss in level rises steadily over time compared with 
pre-crisis regime) 
 
Lower long-term output growth after the crisis    
(e.g. 1.5%)(lower post-crisis slope) 
Potential growth before 
crisis (e.g. 2%) 
Years
Potential output level 
Potential output 
loss increasing 
overtime 
 
Source: Commission services. 
As depicted in the upper panel of Graph 27, the 
temporary negative effects of the crisis can be 
progressively reversed as the economy recovers 
and potential output returns eventually to its pre-
crisis expansion path. This scenario requires the 
initial deceleration of potential growth during the 
early stages of the crisis to be followed by several 
years of rapid (i.e. above trend) potential growth 
to compensate for the initial shortfall.  
The middle panel of Graph 27 illustrates a 
second possible scenario where the temporary 
negative effects are progressively reversed but 
only partially. Long-term growth returns to its 
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pre-crisis level but the initial losses in output are 
not entirely recouped and the economy moves 
along a lower expansion path. A key issue in this 
scenario is the time needed by the economy to 
return to its pre-crisis trend growth. The slower 
the adjustment of medium-term growth rates to 
long-term trends, the greater the final loss in the 
potential output level compared with the pre-
crisis expansion path. 
Finally, the lowest panel depicts a scenario where 
long-term growth does not return to its pre-crisis 
level but declines to a permanently lower level. In 
that case, the pre- and post-crisis expansion 
paths diverge continuously in the long run.  
A key objective of the analysis presented in this 
focus section is to assess which scenario is the 
most likely to prevail in the current context.  
2.  Lessons from past episodes of 
financial and economic crises 
The analysis of past episodes of economic and 
financial crises offer interesting insight into the 
possible effects of the current turmoil on 
potential output growth. The past two years have 
seen the emergence of substantial empirical 
literature on the impact of severe financial and 
banking crises on growth and other 
macroeconomic variables. This section reviews 
the main findings of this research. Recessions 
driven by financial and banking crises remain rare 
events in advanced economies in general and in 
the euro area in particular. In an effort to 
broaden the sample of crisis episodes considered, 
the section also analyses the impact of past 
severe recessions – whether triggered by banking 
crises or not – on potential.  
Financial crises are deeper and last longer 
than other recessions…  
In a seminal paper, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 
review recent episodes of severe financial crises 
in a broad sample of advanced and emerging 
economies and examine the macroeconomic 
performance in the aftermath of these crises.17 
                                                     
17 Reinhart, C. M. and K. S. Rogoff (2009) ‘This Time is 
Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of 
Financial Crises’, NBER Working Paper Series, No. 13882. 
They find that financial crises lead to larger losses 
in output and employment than other recessions. 
On average, output falls by over 9% and the 
duration of the recession averages around two 
years, which is about one year more than usual 
recessions. This sharp drop in output is typically 
followed by a significant deterioration of the 
labour market. Similar analyses are carried out by 
Haugh et al. (2009) and by Claessens et al. (2008) 
for OECD countries.18 They confirm that 
recessions associated with financial distress last 
longer than other recessions and that the output 
losses are two to three times larger. 
… and they tend to have a permanent 
negative effect on the level of output 
Cerra and Saxena (2008) analyse the behaviour of 
output following banking crises using a simple 
autoregressive model.19 They find that the impact 
of banking crises on the level of output is 
negative, large and highly persistent. Their result 
applies both to emerging and to industrialised 
countries. This persistent impact on the level of 
output is also documented by Pisany-Ferry and 
van Pottelsberghe (2009), who analyse four 
countries (Finland, Japan, South Korea and 
Sweden) that were severely hit by financial crises 
in the 1990s.20 Another recent study based on 30 
OECD countries, by Furceri and Mourougane 
(2009), goes one step further and assesses the 
impact of financial crises on GDP potential. It 
reports a significant and persistent effect with a 
permanent reduction in the level of potential 
output of 1.5% to 2.4%.21 When restricting the 
18  Haugh D., P. Ollivaud and D. Turner (2009), 'The 
macroeconomic consequences of banking crises in 
OECD countries', OECD Economic Department Working 
Paper, No 683, OECD. 
Claessens, S., M; Ayhan Kose and E Terrones (2008), 
'What happens during recessions, crunches and busts?', 
IMF Working Paper, WP/8/274, IMF. 
19 Cerra, V. and S. Saxena (2008) ‘Growth dynamics: the 
myth of economic recovery’, American Economic Review, 
No. 98(1), 439-457. 
20  Pisani-Ferry J. and B. van Pottelsberghe (2009) ‘Handle 
with care! Post-crisis growth in the EU’, Bruegel Policy Brief, 
2009/02. 
21  Furceri D and A. Mourougane (2009), 'The effect of 
financial crises on potential output: new empirical 
evidence from OECD countries', OECD Economic 
Department Working Paper, No 699, OECD. 
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sample to major financial crises, the estimated 
effect is even bigger, at 4%.  
But evidence on their impact on long-term 
growth is more mixed 
In contrast, there is only limited evidence of a 
lasting negative impact of financial/banking 
crises on potential growth. Haugh et al. (2009) 
analyse the impact of banking crises on potential 
growth in Finland, Norway, Sweden, the US and 
Japan by comparing potential growth estimates 
before and after the crises. While potential 
growth decreased markedly in Japan, it increased 
moderately in Sweden and Norway and remained 
broadly stable in the US and Finland. In the case 
of Japan, lower potential was the result of a fall 
in TFP growth and lower capital deepening. The 
increase in potential growth in the other 
countries was driven by higher TFP growth.  
In line with the conclusions of Haugh et al. 
(2009), a recent study from the CPB finds mixed 
results on the effect of financial crises on long-
term growth.22 Major financial crises are analysed 
in 14 emerging and advanced countries by 
comparing changes in GDP/capita growth 
before and after the crises. In half of the sample, 
the growth rate prevailing ten years after the 
trough of the crisis appears lower than before the 
financial crisis. The sample is, however, 
dominated by emerging countries and 
conclusions should therefore be interpreted with 
caution. 
The two studies reviewed here do not offer any 
analysis on the possible causes of country 
differences in developments in potential growth 
following recessions. Box 2 provides some 
insight on the issue by analysing the impact of 
past financial crises in Japan and Finland using 
data by industrial sectors. The differences in the 
impact on potential growth can be explained by 
the fact that Finland used the crisis as an 
opportunity to engineer a fundamental 
restructuring of its manufacturing sector, with a 
sharp reallocation of resources to 'ICT 
producing' industries (with positive spillover 
effects on related service sector industries). In 
contrast, in Japan, the 1990s were marked by 
                                                     
22  M. Roscam Abbing (2009), 'The credit crisis and the 
Dutch economy 2009-2010', CPB Memorandum, CPB.  
significant and sustained shrinkage in the 
economic importance of the manufacturing 
sector.  
Higher output growth volatility tends to be 
associated with lower GDP growth  
Another strand of literature also appears to have 
some relevance in the current context. A large 
number of studies have looked into the impact of 
macroeconomic volatility on output growth. 
Although this literature does not specifically 
cover financial crises, it is of particular interest 
now since the current turmoil marks a clear 
inflection in the so-called Great Moderation23 
(i.e. the trend of declining output volatility 
observed during the past three decades). Studies 
based on both cross-sectional regressions and 
panel regressions have generally found a negative 
correlation between medium-term GDP growth 
and the volatility of GDP in OECD countries 
(Ramey and Ramey 1995, Kneller and Young 
2001, Hnatkovska and Loayza 2005).24 25 The 
negative correlation is probably due to large 
recessions rather than small fluctuations around 
trend growth. This argument is supported by the 
findings of Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005), who 
test the impact of measures of normal and crisis 
volatility. Only cyclical volatility due to economic 
crises is found to have a significant impact on 
growth.26 Therefore, the negative impact of 
output volatility on long-term growth identified  
23  European Commission (2007), 'Quarterly report on the 
euro area', Vol. 6, No 1, pp. 37-46.  
24  The negative correlation between GDP growth and the 
volatility of GDP growth can be explained by the same 
factors that have a negative impact on growth during 
recession, as discussed in the previous section, such as the 
hysteresis effect, sharp drops in investment, etc. 
25  Ramey, G., and V. A. Ramey (1995), 'Cross-country 
evidence on the link between volatility and growth', 
American Economic Review, Vol. 85, No 5, pp. 1138–51.  
Kneller, R. and G. Young (2001), 'Business cycle 
volatility, uncertainty, and long-run growth', The 
Manchester School 69, 2001 (5), pp. 534–552.  
Hnatkovska, V. and N. Loayza (2003), 'Volatility and 
Growth'. Working Paper WPS3184, World Bank. 
26  A given level of volatility (as measured, for example, by 
the standard deviation of output growth) can reflect 
frequent small cyclical fluctuations or less frequent but 
sharper cyclical swings. According to Hnatkovska and 
Loayza (2005), only the latter affects growth negatively.  
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Box 2: Assessment of the impact of the financial crisis in the 1990s in Japan and Finland:  
an industry perspective  
This box uses the EU KLEMS industry level database to explore the impact of the financial crises that Japan and 
Finland experienced in the late 1980s / early 1990s.  
The specific situations and different starting positions partially explain the differences between the two countries. 
The cases of Finland and Japan are very different, with the scale and nature of the domestically generated 
financial/housing bubbles having specific country features and Finland having experienced the collapse in its trade 
with the former USSR. Furthermore, any potential policy recommendations must take account of the very different 
starting positions of both economies. For example, it is clear that since Japan already had exceptionally high capital-
output ratios and had relentlessly pursued a technology-driven development strategy over many decades that it was a 
lot easier for Finland, which was a heavily resource-based economy in the early 1990s, to move up the value added 
chain by pursuing an innovation-driven policy path.  
Significantly different policy strategies to address essentially similar policy challenges resulted in a fundamentally 
different degree of restructuring of the economy. Despite the country differences, both Japan and Finland were 
faced with the same fundamental policy challenge, namely how to react to the immediate contraction in output and 
how to restructure their economies in a way which would re-utilise the resources released from the inevitable 
shrinkage of specific industries (finance, construction, traditional manufacturing industries, etc.) in an efficient 
manner. Finland used the crisis as an opportunity for a fundamental restructuring of its manufacturing sector (with 
spillover effects on related service sector industries) – in stark contrast to Japan where the 1990s saw a significant 
and sustained reduction in the economic importance of its manufacturing sector. There were large differences in the 
extent of restructuring in the Japanese and Finnish economies, the overall rate of change being significantly higher in 
Finland, and a sharp increase in its share of "ICT producing" industries being a feature not only of its manufacturing 
sector but also of related areas in its private services sector. 
Finland's experience shows that any recovery strategy must focus on ensuring the health of the tradeables sector. An 
interesting observation from the analysis is the contrasting fortunes experienced by the Finnish and Japanese 
authorities with respect to their "tradeable" goods and services industries. The extent to which Finland successfully 
achieved a radical restructuring of its manufacturing sector away from resource-based materials and products to high 
technology, ICT-driven, product ranges is quite striking. These new product ranges were also linked, in a 
complementary manner, with the expansion of ICT-related tradeable services. In the case of Japan, it is equally 
extraordinary to witness the ongoing deterioration in the relative share of manufacturing in its overall value added. 
This deterioration is pervasive across almost all of the manufacturing industries and is surprising given that Japan's 
economic success over the previous decades had been based essentially on shifting resources into capital-intensive, 
export-oriented, manufacturing industries.  
Japan made significant structural policy mistakes. Whilst an industry-level analysis cannot assess the merits of the 
conventional view that most of Japan's problems reflect fundamental monetary and fiscal policy errors in its reaction 
to its 1990s crisis, what it can do, however, is gauge the extent of the structural policy mistakes that were made. The 
Japanese authorities appeared to be in collective denial about the scale of the downturn, with the desire for 
fundamental structural change held back by having a track record of enormous success up until the late 1980s with 
its previous policy approach and by having large stocks of accumulated financial assets with which to cushion the 
income losses for its rapidly ageing citizens. This absence of a desire to change was reflected in the slowness of the 
Japanese response in reducing employment levels in the affected industries; by its slowness in shrinking its bloated 
industries and releasing the labour and capital resources needed for the new industries of the future (e.g. the 
construction/real estate; wholesale and retail trade; and financial services industries either maintained or increased 
their shares of total value added in the period up to 2000); and an economy-wide slowness to restructure as reflected 
in an overall industrial structure which in 1999 / 2000 looked remarkably similar to the one that existed in 1989 / 
1990.  
 
The analysis supports the view that all "economic decisions are at the margin" – consequently, without detailed 
assessment at industry/firm levels, the potential for serious policy errors in the present crisis is significant. The EU 
KLEMS analysis shows clearly that a lot of the changes in macro level trends in GDP, investment and TFP are being 
driven not only by a small group of industries but also by a very small proportion of the total capital stock. In the 
case of Finland, for example, its mid-1990s turnaround was driven by just one pivotal industry, communications 
equipment, and by technology / investment decisions that affected less than 2% of the overall Finnish capital stock. 
It was undoubtedly the efficiency and industry focus of specific investments, rather than the overall macroeconomic 
quantity of investment, which dictated the evolution and intensity of the Finnish recovery process.  
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in the literature appears to be particularly relevant 
in the current situation.  
A closer look at a broader sample of banking 
and non-banking recessions  
Because financial crises are relatively rare events 
in advanced economies, the samples of historical 
episodes analysed in the above-mentioned 
studies are either small or extended with 
emerging markets. Whether conclusions based 
on such samples can be extrapolated to the 
current situation in the euro area is therefore 
difficult to say. Finland in the early 1990s is the 
only example of a serious banking crisis in the 
euro area since World War II.  
In an attempt to circumvent this size limitation 
while making the sample more euro-area 
relevant, the remainder of this section presents 
an analysis based on all major recessions 
(whether associated with a banking crisis or not) 
in the EU-15 and the US since the 1990s. 
Beyond statistical considerations, the extension 
to non-banking recessions is also justified by the 
fact that banking crises and other major 
recessions share a number of similarities. 
Although recessions tend to be somewhat less 
deep when they are not triggered by a banking 
crisis, they are still characterised by important 
disruptions in activity, sectoral reallocations and 
sharp drops in investment, with possible 
implications for potential growth.  
Table 6: Major recessions in the 1990s 
  Recessions 
Major banking crises (1) 
FI 1990-1993 
SE 1991-1993 
US 1991 
Other major recessions 
BE 1993 
DE 1993 
EL 1992-1993 
ES 1993 
FR 1993 
IT 1993 
PT 1993 
UK 1991-1992 
(1) The major banking crises are Finland (1991) and Sweden 
(1991) and the US Savings and Loan crisis (early 1990s). 
Source: Commission services. 
 
To shed some light on the impact of major 
recessions on long-term growth, potential growth 
and its components are compared in the ten-year 
period before and after a major recession in each 
country (see Table 6).27 This is similar to the 
approach used in Haugh et al. (2009).28 DG 
ECFIN's production function estimates are used 
to assess potential growth and the contributions 
of TFP, capital and labour.  
History points to high risks of a TFP-driven 
fall in potential growth following recessions  
Potential growth increased following the major 
banking crises in Finland, Sweden and the US 
(Tables 7). When expanding the sample to all 
severe recessions during the 1990s, the picture 
appears considerably more mixed. Potential 
growth increased in broadly half of the episodes 
considered (EL, ES, FI, SE, UK and US) and 
decreased in the other half (BE, DE, FR, IT and 
PT).  
The analysis does not point to a significant effect 
of recessions on the contribution of capital to 
potential growth in the long run. A persistent 
post-recession deceleration in capital intensity 
can only be seen in FI, SE and EL. Changes in 
capital accumulation in these countries seem to 
reflect structural factors and a shift to a less 
capital-intensive growth model.  
There is some evidence of an increase in the 
contribution of labour to potential growth after a 
severe recession in some countries. Seven out of 
the eleven recession episodes considered exhibit 
an increase in this contribution. This increase is 
explained by the rise in the participation rate 
resulting from the structural reforms carried out 
in euro-area countries since mid 1990s. In 
Germany, Italy and Sweden, the contribution of 
labour to potential growth decreased persistently.  
                                                     
27  The criteria chosen to identify major recessions are: (i) a 
minimum contraction of annual GDP per capita of 1%; 
or (ii) two or more consecutive years of GDP/capita 
contraction with one contraction of at least 0.5% 
28  It should however be noted that the 10-year periods do 
not cover exactly the same years. Haugh et al. (2009) take 
the 10-year period prior to the onset of the downturn and 
compare it with the 10 years immediately following it. 
Here the 10-year periods exclude the most severe part of 
the downturn, i.e. when GDP/capita is still contracting. 
This should allow to calculate 10-year averages that are 
not dominated by the economy's behaviour during the 
contraction phase.  
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Table 7. Changes in average potential growth and its determinants around major recessions 
(ten-year averages in %) (1) 
  Potential TFP (2) K accumulation (2) Labour (Hours) (2) 
  Before After Before After Before After Before After 
 Major banking crises* 
FI 2.8 3.1 1.9 2.4 1.0 0.3 -0.1  0.4 
SE 1.9 2.5 0.7 1.8 0.8 0.5  0.4  0.2 
US 3.1 3.3 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.0  1.1  1.0 
 Other major recessions 
BE 2.2 2.1 1.5 1.0 0.7 0.7 -0.1  0.4 
DE 2.5 1.6 1.7 1.2 0.7 0.7  0.1 -0.2 
EL 0.9 3.1 0.0 1.7 0.8 0.8  0.2  0.6 
ES 2.7 3.1 1.4 0.3 1.1 1.3  0.1  1.5 
FR 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.1 0.9 0.8 -0.4  0.0 
IT 2.4 1.4 1.2 0.5 0.9 0.6  0.4  0.2 
PT 3.2 2.5 2.1 1.0 1.3 1.3 -0.2  0.2 
UK 2.4 2.8 1.6 1.8 0.6 0.7  0.2  0.3 
(1) The averages exclude the years of the downturn, during which GDP/capita is still negative (see Table 6). 
(2) Contributions to potential growth – Components do not always add up due to rounding. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
In Germany and Italy, the fall can be largely 
explained by a significant drop in the working 
age population; a development independent of 
the recession. In Sweden, the reason lies in the 
fall of the participation rate.  
TFP growth emerges as the key factor explaining 
country differences in developments in potential 
growth around recessions. The group of 
countries which experienced an increase in TFP 
growth (EL, FI, SE, UK and US) coincides with 
the group that also benefited from an increase in 
potential growth, except for Spain.29 In the other 
episodes, recessions were associated with a large 
decrease in TFP growth of 0.8% on average.  
Overall, the analysis points to a substantial risk of 
a TFP-driven drop in potential growth after 
recessions. An in-depth study would be needed 
to analyse the causes of the drop but at least four 
factors seem to have been at play. First, TFP 
growth was already on a downward trajectory 
before the recessions in some of the countries, in 
which cases it is difficult to judge to what extent 
the post-crisis deceleration in TFP is attributable 
to the recession or merely a continuation of pre-
crisis trend. Second, there seems to be some 
                                                     
29  In Spain, the increase in potential growth was mainly the 
result of a substantial increase in the contribution of 
labour input, which can be explained by the strong rise in 
the participation rate during those years.  
relation between a country's success in increasing 
or at least preserving its level of R&D during and 
after the crisis and its TFP performance. Third, 
most of the countries which were able to lift or 
maintain TFP growth after the recession also 
posted a comparatively high degree of flexibility 
in resource reallocation, allowing the economy to 
absorb shocks better. Fourth, in some of these 
successful countries, trade seems to have played 
an important role in the recovery phase, with 
nominal exchange depreciations acting as a 
catalyst.   
3.  Assessing the impact of the crisis on 
euro-area potential output  
A sharp drop in potential growth in the short 
term…  
Estimates of the euro-area's potential output 
based on production functions point to a marked 
deceleration of potential growth over the short 
term. As shown in Table 8, the economic crisis 
has led to a sharp downward revision of the 
Commission's estimates of potential output 
growth rates in 2009-10. In the euro area, 
potential growth is projected to drop by half in 
2009-2010 compared with 2008, i.e. from a 
growth rate of 1.3% to 0.7%. This fall is due to 
large increases in structural unemployment and 
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Table 8: Potential growth rate developments, euro area  
(in %, 2007-2010) 
Percentage points contribution to potential growth
 
Potential growth 
(annual changes)  
Labour Capital TFP 
NAIRU 
(% of labour 
force) 
Investment ratio 
(% of potential 
output) 
2000-2006 1.8   0.4 0.8 0.6  8.5  8.5 
2007 1.6   0.3 0.9 0.4  8.7  8.7 
2008 1.3   0.1 0.8 0.4  9.0  9.0 
2009 0.7 -0.3 0.5 0.4  9.7  9.7 
2010 0.7 -0.1 0.4 0.5 10.2 10.2 
Source: Commission services. 
 
to a substantially reduced contribution of capital. 
Trend TFP growth is projected to remain close 
to its pre-crisis level. These projections are 
subject to considerable uncertainty and should 
therefore be interpreted with caution.30  They 
suggest, however, that the crisis will have a deep 
short-term impact on potential output via a rise 
in the NAIRU and a fall in the investment rate. 
Both channels should be roughly equivalent in 
size over the 2009-10 period, although the 
NAIRU effect may kick in somewhat more 
rapidly. The two effects reflect the exceptional 
strength of the ongoing crisis and should a-priori 
be gradually reversed once the economy 
recovers. The rise in the NAIRU is attributable 
to the temporary impact of nominal wage 
rigidities while the slowdown in capital 
accumulation reflects the strong cyclicality of 
investment. 
… followed by a slow return to pre-crisis 
potential growth  
At this juncture, the most likely scenario is one 
of a medium-term return of potential growth to 
its pre-crisis long-term trend as the negative 
capital and labour effects identified above are 
gradually reversed. Empirical evidence of the 
effect of past crises shows, however, that the 
economy will not return to its pre-crisis 
expansion path but will shift to a lower one (as in 
the middle panel of Graph 27). In other words, 
                                                     
                                                     
30  The estimates of potential growth in 2009-10 are based 
on the Commission's spring forecast and are therefore 
subject to the usual uncertainty. In addition, estimates of 
trend TFP appear particularly uncertain at this juncture 
due to the unprecedented decline in capacity utilisation, 
the difficulty in estimating capital obsolescence rates and 
uncertainties regarding the impact of the financial crisis 
on R&D spending and the pace of innovation.  
the crisis will entail a permanent loss in the level 
of potential output. One of the factors that will 
shape the size of this loss is the speed at which 
the economy reverts to long-term trends. The 
slower the adjustment to long-term trends, the 
greater the final loss in potential output level 
compared with a pre-crisis expansion path. The 
risks that the adjustment process will be 
protracted appear unfortunately to be high due to 
the specific characteristics of the current crisis, 
including its duration, its global nature and 
underlying changes in risk behaviour. 
First, the latest forecasts suggest that the current 
crisis will be more protracted than its 
predecessors.31 This will lengthen the potential 
output adjustment phase as the capital and 
employment effects identified above are only 
reversed slowly. Moreover, the protracted rise in 
the NAIRU might lead to hysteresis effects as 
workers lose their skills, causing a larger loss in 
the potential output level. Many discouraged 
workers may also withdraw from the labour 
force, thereby cutting labour supply. Second, the 
global nature of the current crisis makes it harder 
to engineer a strong recovery via rechanneling 
resources from the non-tradable sector to the 
export sector, as world demand is sharply 
depressed. The Finish and Swedish 'miracles' 
seen after the financial crisis in the early 1990s 
were partly due to sectoral re-allocation of labour 
and capital toward the IT export sector. Third, 
the changes in attitudes towards risk brought 
about by the turmoil may have a lasting impact  
31  The Commission's spring forecasts project euro-area 
GDP to contract by 4% in 2009 and by 0.1% in 2010. 
Previous post-war recessions were clearly shorter with a 
single year of GDP contraction followed by a year of 
healthy growth.  
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Box 3: The impact of the financial crisis on growth – Some model simulations  
 
This box presents a model-based analysis of the impact of the financial crisis on euro-area growth. The European 
Commission's QUEST III model is used to simulate the medium and long-term impact of the crisis on potential 
output. To illustrate the likely effects of the financial crisis, a recession scenario is constructed by simulating the 
effect of a 200 bp increase in risk premiums in the equations determining corporate and housing investment as well 
as house prices. The increase in risk premiums can be interpreted as a correction to over-optimistic expectations in 
financial markets. It is calibrated so as to generate a fall in euro-area GDP of about 4% in 2009. 
 
Economic downturn generated by an adverse financial shock 
(increase in risk premiums of 200 bp for 3 years) (1) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2018 2028 
GDP  -3.98  -4.24 -3.96  -3.77  -3.65  -3.26 -2.25 
Capital T  -0.57  -1.71 -2.72  -3.56  -4.27  -6.50 -7.16 
Capital NT  -0.28  -1.09 -2.06  -3.01  -3.89  -6.80 -7.86 
Employment  -4.08  -4.64 -4.03  -3.50  -3.07  -1.64 -0.01 
Employment smoothed  -0.44  -1.23 -1.79  -2.14  -2.34  -2.22 -0.67 
Investment -13.88 -21.24 -22.28 -21.54 -20.26 -13.86 -6.12 
Real wages   0.31   0.13 -0.20  -0.50  -0.76  -1.75 -2.30 
Nominal wages  -0.71  -1.94 -3.04  -4.01  -4.87  -7.93 -9.68 
Price level GDP  -1.02  -2.06 -2.84  -3.53  -4.14  -6.29 -7.55 
Potential output (2)  -0.37  -1.17 -1.91  -2.53  -3.04  -4.31 -3.98 
   Capital  -0.13  -0.49 -0.93  -1.37  -1.77  -3.12 -3.62 
   Labour  -0.24  -0.68 -0.99  -1.18  -1.30  -1.22 -0.37 
(1) All variables reported in the table are in per cent deviations from baseline levels. 
(2) Potential output is calculated by using a weighted average of capital and smoothed employment (in order to capture the low frequency 
components of employment). 
Source: Commission services. 
 
As shown in the table above, the rise in risk premiums affects potential via both employment and investment in the 
short run. However, whereas the effect of employment on potential growth becomes negligible after 5 years, it is  far 
more persistent in the case of capital and still significant after ten years (as the simulations are presented in deviations 
from the baseline, effects on potential growth should be measured by comparing two successive years). Interestingly, 
the simulations also suggest that the shock on risk premiums will have a permanent effect on the level of potential 
output (i.e. they entail a downward shift in the expansion path of potential output) and a lasting (but non-
permanent) effect on potential growth. The simulation does not point to any loss in potential growth after 10 years. 
The negative contribution from capital to potential GDP results from increases in risk premiums on loans to firms 
and households (reflecting more cautious lending behaviour on the part of banks) and from a correction of 
overinvestment after a boom period (possibly generated by a bubble in financial and housing markets). The shock to 
risk premiums causes a lasting drop in the investment rate, which, given the direct relation between the investment 
rate and capital growth, explains the persistent effect on the contribution of capital.  
 
As the NAIRU increases substantially in the short run, the negative effect of employment in the first two years is 
larger than the adverse contribution from capital, while in the medium term the negative contribution from capital is 
dominant. Downward nominal rigidity of wages appears to explain the rise of the NAIRU. Indeed, an increase in real 
wages for 2009 and 2010 can be seen. To test whether this conjecture is correct, the same simulation experiment was 
run, but this time with very low nominal wage stickiness. With this assumption on wage behaviour, wages respond 
strongly to adjust employment, however at the cost of a very sharp decline in real wages. This suggests that it is 
indeed very costly for workers to keep unchanged employment levels in an economic environment with falling 
capital stock. Additional QUEST simulations indicate that in the absence of frictions in both goods and labour 
market the economy adjusts much more smoothly to the shock in risk premiums, leading to less fluctuation in GDP.  
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on potential growth. Model simulations, 
described in more detail in Box 3, suggest that a 
permanent increase in risk premiums, reflecting 
investors' and corporations' more cautious 
approach to risks, could have a long-lasting 
impact on capital accumulation and therefore 
potential growth. According to the simulations, 
for example, a 200 bp increase in risk premiums 
still translates into a 0.2 pp reduction in potential 
growth – mostly due to the capital channel – 
after ten years.  
An additional source of uncertainty regarding the 
phase of adjustment of potential growth to its 
long-term trend relates to TFP. There are indeed 
serious downside risks to medium-term 
prospects for TFP growth. These concern the 
ongoing process of industrial restructuring and 
innovation. Major recessions are generally 
associated with a process of industrial 
restructuring as some of the shocks causing the 
recession also force resources to be reallocated 
across sectors and from less productive to more 
productive enterprises. A slow process of 
industrial restructuring, caused either by credit 
constraints – due to delayed adjustments in the 
banking sector – or by entrenched structural 
rigidities, could have a lasting negative effect on 
the level and growth rate of TFP by locking 
resources in relatively unproductive activities or 
enterprises.32 In the case of Japan, Caballero et 
al. (2008) argue that the slow restructuring of the 
banking sector during the Lost Decade allowed 
credit to continue to flow to bankrupt firms (the 
so-called "zombies"), keeping them alive at the 
expense of the entry of more productive 
competitors.33 This seems to have depressed 
overall productivity growth in Japan for several 
years. The effect of restructuring on TFP could 
also be magnified by the accelerated 
obsolescence of some capital vintages brought 
about by the restructuring process.  
Finally, downside risks to medium-term TFP 
prospects also relate to depressed investments in 
                                                     
32  This argument obviously only applies to cases where the 
recession is associated with a shift from low to high 
productivity sectors. In the opposite situation, a slow 
restructuring process would delay the downshift to lower 
trend TFP.  
33  Caballero R.J., T. Hoshi and A. K. Kashyap (2008), 
'Zombie lending and depressed restructuring in Japan', 
American Economic Review, 98:5, 1943-77. 
private R&D, which is known to be markedly 
pro-cyclical. TFP drivers, such as physical 
investment, R&D and innovation, may suffer 
further from a prolonged recession and the 
changes in attitudes towards risk. In particular, 
credit constraints and investors' more cautious 
attitudes towards risks could have a 
disproportionate effect on young and innovative 
firms, thereby reducing the pace of innovation. 
There is indeed evidence that R&D investment 
becomes even more pro-cyclical as firms face 
tighter credit constraints.34 Finally, risks to R&D 
spending are not confined to the private sector. 
Strains in public finances could also constrain 
public investment in research as attention shifts 
to more short-term spending priorities.   
Risks of a permanent downshift in potential 
growth should not be played down  
We have argued that, although the adjustment 
phase could be protracted, the most likely 
scenario for the euro area is for a return of 
potential growth to its pre-crisis long-term trend. 
Nevertheless, risks of a moderate crisis-induced 
reduction in long-run potential growth cannot be 
ruled out in the absence of adequate policy 
responses.  
Whereas economic theory suggests that the effect 
of the crisis on potential growth via the capital 
and labour channels should be largely temporary, 
the same does not apply to TFP. Basically, most 
of the sources of downside risks to TFP 
identified in the previous section could also turn 
into sources of permanent downshift in TFP 
growth. Changes in attitude towards risks and a 
rise in risk premiums could have a lasting effect 
on R&D spending and innovation activity, 
leading to a drop in long-term TFP growth 
prospects. There is also a risk that rigidities and 
bad policies might durably hinder the necessary 
industrial restructuring processes, thereby 
weighing lastingly on TFP growth. The existence 
of such risks is backed by the historical evidence 
presented in Section 2. In a number of euro-area 
Member States, the recession of the 1990s was 
34 Aghion, P., P. Askenazy, N. Berman, G. Cette and L. 
Eymard (2008), 'Credit constraints and the cyclicality of 
R&D investment: Evidence from France', PSE Working 
Papers, 2008-26, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). 
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followed by enduring deceleration in potential 
due to weaker TFP growth. The long-lasting 
deceleration of potential in conditions which 
were arguably less dramatic than those prevailing 
now suggests that the downside risks on long-
term prospects for TFP growth are substantial. 
Such risks should not be played down and 
curtailing them appears to be an essential policy 
challenge at the current juncture. 
4.  Adequate policy responses are needed 
To sum up, unless appropriate policies are 
implemented, the euro area is likely to experience 
a sharp drop in potential growth in the short 
term, followed by a very gradual return to pre-
crisis trend growth. As a result, the economy will 
have to face permanent losses in the potential 
output level compared with a pre-crisis 
expansion path. This situation is reflected by the 
middle panel of Graph 27. The return to long-
term trends is likely to be slower in the current 
crisis than in previous recessions due to the 
duration of the crisis, its global nature and the 
changes in attitudes towards risk. Moreover, 
there is a risk that part of the reduction in 
potential growth seen in the short term may 
become entrenched, especially if the new 
financial conditions are more restrictive in the 
long run and harm TFP growth through less 
dynamic innovation and depressed R&D 
investment. This is the situation shown in the 
bottom panel of Graph 27.  
Nevertheless, the ultimate outcome of the crisis 
will depend to a very large extent on the policy 
reactions. To contain the permanent losses in the 
level of potential output traditionally associated 
with a financial crisis and to reduce the risks of a 
lasting deceleration of TFP growth, timely and 
appropriate policy responses – encompassing a 
wide range of measures and covering several 
reform areas – need to be put in place 
Need for timely policy action 
It will be crucial to start implementing adequate 
policy action promptly so as to raise the long-run 
potential output growth, while avoiding policies 
that may be appealing in the short run but could 
be potentially damaging for the potential output 
growth in the longer run. Growth- and 
efficiency-orientated policies are necessary not 
only to help EU economies to return to the "pre-
crisis" potential growth path but also, if possible, 
to recoup some of the cumulated loss in the 
GDP level suffered in the course of the crisis. 
Making up for this loss will require a steep 
increase in "potential growth", i.e. (at least) a 
temporary increase in potential growth above the 
rates experienced prior to the financial and 
economic crisis. 
Since the crisis may already have exerted adverse 
effects on future potential growth (e.g. due to a 
drop in investment rates), long-term supply-side 
action should be undertaken now, in addition to 
demand-enhancing measures, and should, by no 
means, wait until the crisis is over before being 
implemented. Despite the difficulties involved in 
taking action and the possibly lesser appetite for 
reforms, there is a need for a comprehensive 
approach using a wide range of available 
instruments to tackle the multi-faceted factors 
impinging on potential growth. The need to 
continue and, indeed, deepen the structural 
reform processes in a number of European 
markets could be catered for by the Lisbon 
strategy, which is to be reviewed in 2010. In any 
case, the issue of adequate and timely policy 
responses will be a substantial part of the debate 
on "Lisbon post-2010". The timing of policies 
aiming to dismantle structural rigidities is a 
particularly important and sensitive issue, given 
that, in the short term, the latter may to some 
extent strengthen "automatic" stabilisers, on the 
one hand, while hampering recovery and 
medium-term potential growth, on the other.  
Adequate policy responses should 
encompass a wide array of measures 
Adequate policy responses should encompass a 
wide range of areas, including financial markets, 
business environment, labour markets, physical 
investments, R&D investments and innovation 
policies. 
A sine qua non condition– albeit not necessarily 
sufficient – for solving the financial and 
economic crisis and limiting its adverse impact 
on innovation and R&D investment – and 
ultimately on long-term TFP growth and 
potential growth – is to effectively address the 
disruptions in financial markets.  
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Apart from difficult access to the requisite 
financing, the recovery prospects of European 
firms are also potentially threatened by a failure 
to restructure and adapt their business models to 
a new economic environment, including global 
competitive pressures. Rescue policies in favour 
of industries that have been particularly affected 
by the crisis need to support the euro-area's long-
term goals and not freeze resources in 
unproductive activities, which would reduce 
potential output growth in the medium run 
through lower efficiency and lower adjustment 
capacity.  
The role of policies aimed at enhancing labour 
supply, including financial incentives to work, is 
important, including from the perspective of 
protecting the most vulnerable groups threatened 
by long-term exclusion from the labour market. 
Policies that promote wage moderation, alleviate 
nominal rigidities of wages and cut labour taxes 
will reduce structural unemployment and boost 
competitiveness and adjustment capacity. Policies 
that facilitate labour market transitions (e.g. 
active labour market policies such as training and 
public placement) are needed to ease the short-
run adjustment and to smooth the longer-run 
reallocation of resources.  
It is crucial that policies should also be geared to 
sustaining investments in physical and intangible 
capital during the downturn. This will bring 
considerable medium-run and long-run gains in 
potential output growth. In order to sustain and,  
where possible, increase the relatively low pre-
crisis potential growth rates, policies also need to 
promote R&D and innovation efforts already in 
the time of crisis and to prevent their cyclical 
downturn, although some short-run costs 
associated with these policies have to be borne.  
Avoiding tempting policy mistakes 
The current circumstances may increase the 
temptation to have recourse to ill-designed 
policies, the cumulated effect of which could 
severely harm potential output both in the short 
term and also in the longer term. 
First, there might be a tendency to yield to 
protectionist temptations or to try to promote 
national interests at the expense of the proper 
functioning of the Single Market. Such policies 
would lead to sizeable losses in output, have 
negative spillover effects across the world and 
put the long-term credibility of the Single Market 
at risk.  
Second, measures reducing labour market 
participation, such as early retirement schemes, 
would significantly reduce potential output.  
Third, a prolonged crisis may undermine the 
commitment to sustainable fiscal policies, which 
may ultimately lead to higher taxes and limit the 
budgetary scope for accommodating future 
reform efforts. 
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Focus 
III. Dealing with the economic and budgetary challenges posed by 
population ageing in times of crisis* 
Being active and healthy well into old age is now a realistic prospect for very large numbers of people for the first time in 
Europe’s history. But an ageing population also raises challenges for our societies and economies, both cultural, organisational 
and from an economic point of view. Policy-makers worry about how living standards will be affected as each worker has to 
provide for the consumption needs of a growing number of elderly dependents. The seriousness of the challenge depends on how 
our economies and societies respond and adapt to these changing demographic conditions.   
 Looking ahead, policy-makers need to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability in the face of clearly anticipated risks over the 
long-term, as well as significant uncertainty. This is all the more true as Europe is in the midst of the deepest recession in 
decades, which is putting an unprecedented strain on workers and companies and is set to have a major impact on the 
sustainability of public finances. The euro-area’s ability to get out of the slump fast and to restore high and stable growth and 
sound public finances will depend crucially on its ability to deploy targeted and well coordinated policy responses built on 
structural reforms, as stressed by the European Economic Recovery Plan. Once out of the crisis, the long-term prospects will 
depend on the degree of determination to achieve a swift return to sound public finances and increased focus on the structural 
reform agenda as a key part of a credible exit strategy. 
This focus section draws on joint work by the 
European Commission (DG ECFIN) and the 
Economic Policy Committee's Ageing Working 
Group (AWG)36 and presents a new assessment 
of the economic and budgetary challenges posed 
by ageing. The assessment builds on Eurostat's 
most recent long-term demographic projections 
(Section 1), which are used to construct long-
term labour force and growth projections 
(Sections 2 and 3). These are then used to project 
the budgetary implications of ageing (Section 4). 
An analysis of the potential impact of the current 
crisis on long-term trends via several alternative 
scenarios is also presented (Section 5).  
1.  Long-term demographic trends 
Demographic change is transforming Europe: 
longer lives, low fertility and inward migration 
are its key aspects. The extent and speed of 
population ageing depend on future trends in 
these three factors. According to Eurostat's 
EUROPOP2008 projection, future demographic 
developments differ significantly from country to 
country, but the overall population size in the 
                                                     
                                                     
* Section prepared by Per Eckefeldt. 
36  See European Commission, '2009 Ageing Report: 
economic and budgetary projections for the EU 27 
Member States (2008-2060)', European Economy No 2, 
2009. 
euro area37 is projected to remain the same in 
2060 as today, thanks to a slight rebound in the 
fertility rate in some Member States and more 
dynamic immigration flows in recent years.  
Only a modest recovery in total fertility rates, 
which remain low… 
Only a modest recovery in the total fertility rate, 
which is the average number of births per 
woman over her lifetime, is assumed for the euro 
area, from 1.53 births per woman in 2008 to 1.65 
by 2060. In all euro-area countries, the fertility 
rate would remain below the natural replacement 
rate of 2.1 births per woman needed for each 
generation to replace itself. This will result in 
slow growth and in most cases actual declines in 
the population of working-age. 
… while life expectancy continues to 
increase… 
Mortality risks fell dramatically during the 20th 
century, bringing more years of active life for 
both men and women. Life expectancy has been 
rising steadily, with an increase of two and a half 
years per decade in the countries holding the 
record for the highest life expectancy. If the pace 
of future progress in the reduction of mortality 
37  Projections for the euro area assuming unchanged 
membership.  
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remains the same as it has been over past 
decades, most people in the euro area will live 
very long lives. For the euro area as a whole, life 
expectancy at birth for men would increase by 
7.9 years over the projection period, from 76.6 
years in 2008 to 84.5 in 2060. For women, life 
expectancy at birth would increase by 6.7 years, 
from 82.3 in 2008 to 89 in 2060, implying a 
narrowing gap in life expectancy between men 
and women. 
Life expectancy at the age of 65 would increase 
by 5.3 years for men and by 5.1 years for women 
over the projection period. In 2060, life 
expectancy at age 65 would reach 21.8 years for 
men and 25.1 for women.  
… and inward net migration to the euro area 
continues, but decelerates 
Over the projection period, annual net migration 
inflows to the EU are assumed to total 59 
million people, the bulk of them (46.2 million) in 
the euro area. The trend is assumed to decelerate 
over the projection period, falling from about 1 
422 000 people in 2008 (equivalent to 0.4% of 
the euro-area population) to some 627 000 
people by 2060 (0.2% of the euro-area 
population). Migration already plays a 
predominant role in population growth today: in 
many Member States, the size of net migration 
determines whether the population still grows or 
has entered a stage of decline.  
Net migration flows are assumed to be 
concentrated in a few destination countries: Italy 
(12 million cumulated to 2060), Spain 
(11.6 million) and Germany (8.2 million). 
According to these assumptions, the change of 
Spain and Italy from origin to destination 
countries is confirmed in the coming decades.  
Population structures become increasingly 
dominated by old people rather than young 
The population of the euro area as a whole 
would be slightly larger in 2060 than today, but 
much older. The population would increase 
(from 324.9 million in 2008) by about 6% by 
2040, when it would peak (at 345.5 million). A 
steady decline would then take place, with the 
population shrinking by nearly 3%, to 335.1 
million, by 2060.  
Almost half of the population today is 50 years 
old or more. In 2060, more than half of the 
population will be aged 55 or over. The number 
of elderly persons aged 65 or over was already 
higher than the number of children (below 15) in 
2008, but their numbers are relatively close. In 
2060, there would be nearly twice as many elderly 
people as children. In 2008, there were about 
three and two thirds as many children as very old 
people (above 80). In 2060, children would still 
outnumber very old persons, but by a small 
margin: the number of very old people would 
reach 80% of the number of children.  
Graph 28: Population pyramid in 2008 and 2060, euro 
area (thousands) 
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Source: 2009 Ageing Report, Commission services. 
Elderly people would account for an increasing 
share of the population due to sustained 
reductions in mortality in past and future 
decades. The ageing process can be described as 
ageing from the top, as it largely results from 
projected increases in longevity, moderated by 
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the impact of positive net migration flows and 
some recovery in fertility. 
While the euro-area population is projected to 
remain the same in 2060 as it was in 2008, there 
are wide differences in population trends across 
Member States: a majority of them would gain in 
population numbers (Belgium, Ireland, Spain, 
France, Cyprus, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Portugal and Finland,), while the 
population would fall in others (Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia).  
The projections show a significant reduction 
in the population aged 15-64 … 
The working-age population, which is 
conventionally defined as aged between 15 and 
64, would start to decline as of 2010 and, over 
the whole projection period, it would drop by 
15% in the euro area. However, five Member 
States would see their working-age population 
expand: Belgium, Ireland, France, Cyprus and 
Luxembourg, mostly due to migration (except in 
the case of France and Ireland where fertility is 
relatively high). The number of children is 
projected to decline gradually from 2020 
onwards. 
… and an increase in the number of elderly 
persons aged 65 or more… 
The number of elderly people will increase very 
markedly, according to the projection. It will 
almost double, rising from 58 million in 2008 to 
101 million in 2060 in the euro area. The number 
of oldest-old (aged 80 years and above) is 
projected to increase even more rapidly, almost 
tripling from 15 million in 2008 to 43 million in 
2060. The progressive ageing of the elderly 
population itself is a notable aspect of population 
ageing. 
… leading to a doubling of the old-age 
dependency ratio in the euro area 
As a result of these unprecedented demographic 
trends, the old-age dependency ratio, calculated 
as the ratio of people aged 65 or over relative to 
the working-age population aged 15-64, is 
projected to more than double in the euro area 
from 27% to 54% over the projection period. 
The largest increase is expected to occur during 
the period 2015-40. This means that the euro 
area would move from having 4 persons of 
working-age for every person aged over 65 to a 
ratio of only 2 to 1. When adding the number of 
children to the calculation, the ratio of dependent 
to active is projected to rise by about 50%.  
Graph 29: Old-age dependency ratio, euro-area 
Member States  
(persons 65 and over/persons aged 15 to 64, in %) 
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Source: 2009 Ageing Report, Commission services. 
2.  Labour force projections  
Labour participation rates to increase … 
For the euro area, the participation rate (of 
people aged 15 to 64) is projected to increase by 
3½ pp, from 70.8% in 2007 to 74.4% in 2060. 
Almost all of the increase is projected to 
materialise before 2020. The biggest increase in 
participation is projected for older workers, aged 
between 55 and 64 (around 22.5 pp for women 
and 12.5 pp for men). The gap between male and 
female participation rates would gradually 
narrow, especially in countries where it is 
currently wide. 
… but labour supply will decline because of 
the future population trends 
The labour force (15-64) in the euro area would 
increase by almost 5% or about 7.4 million 
people by 2020. This is mainly due to the rise in 
the labour supply of women. However, the 
positive trend in female labour supply is 
projected to reverse after 2020 and, as the male 
labour supply drops too, the overall labour force 
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is expected to decrease by as much as 13% by 
2060, which translates into 21 million people 
(14 million if compared with the number in 
2007). 
A majority of Member States would see their 
labour supply expand until 2020. However, a few 
countries (the Netherlands, Finland and Slovenia) 
will even record a reduction in labour supply 
over the next decade. After 2020, most countries 
are projected to see labour supply shrink over the 
period 2020 to 2060. The projected decrease in 
the labour force after 2020 will be due almost 
entirely to adverse demographic developments. 
According to assumptions, the 
unemployment rate will drop slightly and the 
employment rate will increase… 
Overall, a reduction in the euro-area 
unemployment rate of around 1½ percentage 
points is assumed (from 7.6% in 2007 to 5.9% in 
2020). 
According to assumptions, the employment rate 
(of people aged 15 to 64) in the euro area will 
increase from 65.5% in 2007 to 70% by 2030. 
Reflecting recent positive trends, the 
employment rate of women is assumed to rise 
from 57.7% in 2007 to 63.4% in 2020 and to 
64.9% in 2060. The increase in the employment 
rate will be even larger for older workers (55-64), 
from 42.4% in 2007 to 54.7% in 2020 and to 
60.2% in 2060.   
… but the number of workers will shrink  
However, the number of people employed will 
grow by 6.7% up to 2020, before reversing and 
declining by 13% by 2060. Overall employment 
in the euro area is projected to shrink by about 
10 million people over the entire projection 
period. Increasing labour force participation rates 
in most countries and rising net immigration 
levels in some can only moderate the fall in 
employment caused by the ageing of the 
population and the negative population growth 
in the period from 2020 to 2060.  
Graph 30: Employment rates in the euro area  
(by gender and age group; 2007 and 2060, in %) 
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Source: 2009 Ageing Report, Commission services. 
Hours of work (labour input) are projected to 
decline too 
The total hours of work in the euro area will fall 
by 5.7% between 2007 and 2060 over the entire 
projection period. In annual average growth 
rates, hours of work are projected to fall by 0.1% 
in the euro area over this period. These figures 
reflect projected employment trends and a 
composition effect, due to the increasing share of 
employed persons working part-time (mainly due 
to the increase in women in employment, who 
are more likely to work part-time). 
In line with different demographic trends, a 
reduction in labour input is projected in most 
countries over the period between 2007 and 
2060, with drops of 20% and more in Germany, 
Slovenia and Slovakia. By contrast, a few will see 
an increase in hours worked (Belgium, Ireland, 
Spain, France and Luxemburg). 
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The ratio of elderly non-workers to workers 
will rise steeply 
It is important to consider the ratio of elderly 
non-workers to workers, or the effective 
economic old-age dependency ratio, when 
assessing the impact of ageing on budgetary 
expenditure, above all for public pension 
schemes. For the euro area, the ratio is projected 
to rise sharply from 39% in 2007 to 73% in 2060. 
Hence, the euro area would move from having a 
ratio of 4 elderly non-workers to 10 workers in 
2007 to a ratio of more than 7 to 10. Extremely 
high values are projected in some countries. In 
Slovakia and Malta, for example, the projections 
point to a situation where, by 2060, there will be 
almost as many inactive old persons as people 
working (the ratio will be more than 90%). By 
contrast, the ratio is projected to be under two 
thirds in Ireland, France, Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland.  
A retirement, not an ageing problem 
Ageing is a dynamic process, and the policy 
challenge is to develop labour market and 
welfare-state policies that are adaptable and 
sustainable in the face of uncertain economic and 
demographic developments.  
Table 9: Retirement problem or ageing problem in 
the euro area? 
 Men Woman 
  2008 2060 2008 2060 
Average exit age 61.7 63.4 61.2 63.1 
Life expectancy at 
the time of 
withdrawal 
14.9 21.1 21.1 25.9 
% of adult life 
spent in retirement 19% 25% 26% 29% 
Exit 
postponement, in 
years 
 4.7  3.1 
Source: 2009 Ageing Report, Commission services. 
 
In the euro area, the average exit age from the 
labour market was 61.7 for males and 61.2 for 
females in 2008. By 2060, this is projected to 
have risen to 63.4 and 63.1 respectively, in part 
due to the reforms enacted (see Table 9). This 
implies an increase in the share of adult life spent 
in retirement, from 19% to 25% for males, and 
from 26% to 29% for females. In order to keep 
the share of adult life spent in retirement 
constant at its 2008 level, the average retirement 
age would need to rise by an additional 3 to 5 
years, i.e. a considerably larger increase than 
projected. A priori, there is no economic 
rationale for favouring a constant share of adult 
life spent in retirement, and indeed a preference 
for a longer period of leisure time in retirement 
could be justified on the basis of rising living 
standards. However, retirement decisions need 
be economically and financially viable. 
3.  Labour productivity and potential 
growth 
Total factor productivity is assumed to 
converge to 1.1%  
Total factor productivity (TFP) drives labour 
productivity growth in the long run. A cautious 
assumption was set of Member States' TFP 
growth rates converging to a long-term historical 
average in the EU of 1.1%, as was seen over the 
period from 1970 to 2004, which is close to 
productivity growth in the US over the same 
period. The speed of convergence is determined 
by the relative income position of the Member 
States. Specifically, the lower the current GDP 
per capita, the higher the real catching-up 
potential, which will materialise through a period 
of higher TFP growth. 
A decline in potential growth rate is 
projected… 
Even without incorporating the potential 
negative impact of the current economic crisis, 
the annual average potential GDP growth rate in 
the euro area is projected to fall from 2.2% in the 
period 2007-2020, to 1.5% in the period 2021-
2030 and to a meagre 1.3% in the period 2041-
2060. While all euro-area Member States would 
experience a slowdown in their future potential 
growth rates, owing to the adverse impact of 
demographic trends, growth rates would differ 
substantially from country to country.  
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…and the sources of growth are also 
projected to change, with labour productivity 
becoming the key driver  
For the euro area, labour productivity growth is 
projected to remain fairly stable at close to 1.7%. 
A small increase in the growth rate is expected 
up to the 2030s as a result of the higher 
productivity growth assumed in Member States 
that are catching up. Total hours of work –labour 
input – are projected to increase up to the 2020s. 
Thereafter, demographic ageing, with a reduction 
in the working-age population, is expected to act 
as a drag on growth. Over time, labour 
productivity will become the only driver of 
growth in the euro area. 
Graph 31: Components of potential GDP, euro area 
(annual average growth rate in %) 
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Source: 2009 Ageing Report, Commission services. 
4.  Budgetary projections 
Results of long-term, age-related public 
expenditure projections 
The budgetary projections point to sizeable fiscal 
challenges coming from the higher share of the 
total population in older age cohorts and a 
decline in the economically active share of the 
population. The fiscal impact of ageing is 
projected to be substantial in almost all euro-area 
countries, with effects already becoming apparent 
during the next decade. On the basis of current 
policies, age-related public expenditure is 
projected to increase on average by 5.2 pp of 
GDP by 2060 in the euro area. Most of the 
projected increase in public spending over the 
period 2007-2060 will be on pensions (+2.8 pp 
of GDP), healthcare and long-term care (+1.4 pp 
of GDP each). Potential offsetting savings in 
public spending on education and unemployment 
benefits are likely to be very limited (-0.2 pp of 
GDP each).  
Graph 32: Age-related expenditure components, euro 
area (% of GDP, 2007-2060) 
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Source: 2009 Ageing Report, Commission services. 
In terms of country-specific situations, the 
following points can be made:  
• The age-related increase in public spending 
will be very significant in eight countries 
(Luxembourg, Greece, Slovenia, Cyprus, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Spain and Ireland), 
with a projected increase of 7 pp of GDP or 
more, although for some countries the large 
increase will be from a fairly low level. These 
countries have so far made only limited 
progress in reforming their pension systems 
or have maturing pension systems.  
• For a second group of countries – Belgium, 
Finland, Slovakia and Germany – the age-
related increase in public spending is more 
limited, ranging from 4 pp to 7 pp of GDP. 
Several of these countries have taken 
significant steps to reform their public 
expenditure systems that contribute to limit 
the increase in future expenditure.  
• Finally, the increase is more moderate, 4 pp 
of GDP or less, in Portugal, Austria, France 
and Italy; this is also thanks to the 
implementation of substantial pension 
reforms. For many of them, the projected 
increase in expenditure on healthcare and 
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generally on long-term care is higher than the 
increases in pensions.  
Graph 33: Age-related expenditure in the euro area 
(projected change in pp of GDP, 2007-2060) 
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Source: 2009 Ageing Report, Commission services. 
The highest increase is projected for public 
pension expenditure…  
The demographic transition to an older 
population is the main driver behind the 
projected increase in public pension expenditure. 
This effect alone would push up expenditures 
very significantly in all countries. However, a 
number of factors, also related to past reforms of 
pension systems, are expected to mitigate the 
increase:  
(a) tightening eligibility for public pensions 
(through higher retirement ages and/or reduced 
access to early retirement and better control of 
alternatives to early retirement like disability 
pensions) would constrain public pension 
expenditure in nearly every country. In the large 
majority of countries, this reflects implemented 
pension reforms, often phased in over a long 
period, which lead to higher participation rates of 
older workers during the projection period.  For 
example, pension reforms that have strengthened 
the link between pension benefits and pension 
contributions (or raised the threshold for 
qualifying for a ‘full’ pension), can also 
contribute to raising the retirement age. Trend 
increases in female labour force participation also 
lead to an increase in the effective retirement age 
in a large majority of countries; 
(b) higher employment rates are projected as 
reforms that provide stronger work incentives 
reduce structural unemployment rates in a 
number of countries;  
(c) the generosity of pensions relative to wages is 
projected to decrease. It is captured at an 
aggregate level by the pension benefit ratio, i.e. 
the average pension as a share of the average 
wage. This effect shows very considerable 
differences across Member States. In some 
(Ireland, Greece and Cyprus) average public 
pensions relative to wages remain unchanged or 
even increase over the projection period, while in 
most others, and especially in France, Italy, 
Austria, Portugal and Slovakia, they are projected 
to have fallen significantly by 2060. While 
resulting in budgetary savings, the adequacy of 
pensions should be kept under review. 
Inadequate pension levels may lead to future 
demands for ad hoc government intervention to 
address declines in public pensions relative to 
wage developments and the risk of poverty of 
pensioners.  
Generally, several related issues merit attention: 
(i) removing supply-side barriers to allow people 
to continue to work as they grow older; 
(ii) putting in place flexible mechanisms that 
allow older people to choose to retire even 
beyond the statutory retirement age and affect 
the size of their eventual pension benefit; 
(iii) introducing incentives for 
employees/employers to prolong their working 
lives/retain older workers in the workforce; 
(iv) allowing part-time old-age retirement, as a 
way of combining adequate incomes for older 
persons with improving the labour supply in the 
economy, as well as making the continued 
contribution of older workers more attractive; 
(v) providing relevant and accessible information 
on the need for people to rely on a range of 
different income sources once retired. Incentives 
for private savings can take many different 
forms, ranging from making contributions to 
private pensions schemes compulsory to 
providing tax breaks for regular private pension 
savings.  
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…but healthcare costs rise too… 
Healthcare systems in the euro area are 
expected to face substantial challenges in the 
future. The baseline projection includes an 
increase in healthcare expenditure of 1½ 
percentage points of GDP by 2060. Healthcare 
spending is also strongly related to income 
growth and technological progress. Newly 
developed methods for early diagnosis and 
treatment contribute significantly to growth in 
spending. An analysis of past trends in healthcare 
expenditure suggests that technological 
developments – new and better treatment – are 
responsible for a significant part of overall costs 
growth, which may result in a sizeable increase in 
spending that is not captured in the projection. 
Healthcare spending as a share of GDP could be 
three and even four times higher than in the 
AWG baseline projection by 2060 if 
technological progress is assumed to continue as 
in the past and these costs are not contained. 
However, technological advancement may also 
have positive effects on reducing the costs of 
medical treatment through efficiency gains (faster 
and better treatment). Investment in prevention 
and health technologies offers instruments for 
the population to stay healthy and productive for 
longer. The effective management of technology 
is therefore a major determinant of future 
spending. 
…as does long-term care spending…  
An ageing population will also require increased 
public spending on long-term care. Based on 
current policies, public spending on long-term 
care is projected to increase by 1½ pp of GDP 
by 2060 due to the fact that the very old (aged 
80+) will be the fastest growing age class in the 
population. Again, demographic factors will not 
be the only drivers. Currently, care for the frail 
elderly is provided to a very large extent on an 
informal basis by relatives. Changes in family 
structures, higher labour force participation of 
women and increased geographical mobility 
could reduce the availability of informal care. For 
countries whose formal care systems are less 
developed, the projected increase in public 
spending on long-term care could underestimate 
future pressure on public finances, due to the 
likely need for increased formal care provision. 
…with limited, if any, offsetting effect from 
education spending  
In terms of public education spending, despite 
the decreasing number of children over the 
coming decades, the current objectives and 
targets of education policy in the euro area, and a 
substantial improvement in the quality of 
education, may well require higher educational 
expenditure in the future. Investing in the human 
capital of young people and the adult workforce 
will be crucial to future productivity growth. 
Hence, the small decrease in the public education 
expenditure ratio over the projection period, 
which results solely from changes in the 
demographic composition (fewer children in the 
future), may not materialise. 
5.  The potential impact of the economic 
crisis on long-term budgetary 
projections  
Drastically worse macro-economic developments 
– and prospects – than expected last year add to 
the uncertainty as regards the buoyancy of 
economic growth in the medium to long term. 
The economic crisis that took hold in 2008 has 
led to an unusually sharp and rapid deterioration 
in economic activity. The current slowdown has 
gradually transformed into a world recession. 
This has prompted the question of the extent to 
which the worsened short-term outlook also has 
implications for the medium and longer term.  
Alternative scenarios for GDP growth 
potential in the aftermath of the crisis… 
The AWG/EPC baseline long-term macro-
economic projections for potential growth are 
based on the Commission's forecast made in 
Spring 2008. Since then, the economic outlook 
has deteriorated sharply, with potential adverse 
consequences on potential growth. In an effort 
to simulate the order of magnitude of the long-
term risks connected with the ongoing economic 
crisis, alternative scenarios have been run. In 
view of the considerable uncertainty regarding 
the length of the slump in economic activity, 
three scenarios may be contemplated: 
(i) a pessimistic scenario: "permanent shock"; 
(ii) a less pessimistic scenario: "lost decade", and; 
(iii) an optimistic scenario: "rebound". 
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Graph 34: Alternative crisis scenarios for potential GDP 
(annual % change) 
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Source: 2009 Ageing Report, Commission services. 
More specifically, the three scenarios are based 
on the following assumptions:  
• In the 'rebound' scenario, labour productivity is 
assumed to reach the AWG baseline level in 
2020. Labour input (total hours worked) is 
also assumed to reach the baseline level in 
2020.  
• In the 'lost decade' scenario, labour productivity 
is assumed to reach the AWG baseline 
growth rate in 2020. Labour input (total hours 
worked) is assumed to reach the baseline 
growth rate in 2020. 
• In the 'permanent shock' scenario, labour 
input growth (total hours worked) and 
labour productivity growth will reach: (i) the 
labour input growth rate assuming that the 
unemployment rate is permanently 1 pp 
higher than in the AWG baseline from 2020 
onwards; and (ii) the labour productivity growth 
rate assuming that it is 0.25 pp lower than in 
the AWG baseline from 2020 onwards.  
The impact of the crisis on wealth creation 
depends on its duration and on the extent to 
which policies are put in place that successfully 
enhance the growth potential once out of the 
crisis. The impact of the crisis is at its strongest 
in the 'permanent shock' scenario, but also the 
'lost decade' scenario has an adverse impact on 
the long-term growth potential. In the 'rebound' 
and the 'lost decade' scenarios, potential GDP 
growth for the euro area coincides with the 
AWG baseline from 2020 on. Up to 2020, the 
downward revision of potential GDP growth is 
noticeable in the euro area, 0.6 pp lower on 
average in the 'lost decade' scenario, and 0.7 pp 
in the 'permanent shock' scenario. Over the 
entire projection period 2007-2060, the average 
revision of potential GDP growth in the 'lost 
decade' scenario is 0.2 pp per year for the euro 
area. In the worst case 'permanent shock' 
scenario, a larger downward revision of the 
average annual GDP growth of 0.4 pp over the 
whole projection period would materialise.  
All scenarios show a reduction in GDP per 
capita over the medium term, of between 5 and 
7% by 2015 already. In the 'rebound' scenario, 
this would be recuperated by 2020, as the slump 
would be fully reversed. The 'lost decade 
scenario' implies a reduction in the per-capita 
GDP level in 2060 compared with the baseline, 
which mirrors the lower expected potential 
growth in the decade up to 2020. This period is 
'lost' in terms of accumulated wealth creation.  
Table 10: GDP per capita, euro area 
(difference from baseline, in %) 
 2010 2015 2020 2040 2060
Rebound -3 -5  0   0   0 
Lost decade -3 -7 -8  -8  -8 
Permanent 
shock -3 -7 -10 -14 -18 
Source: 2009 Ageing Report, Commission services. 
 
The loss in GDP per capita in the euro area is 
around 8% in 2020 in the 'lost decade' scenario, 
and this loss is carried over the rest of the 
projection period, since the growth projection 
remains broadly unchanged between 2020 and 
2060. In the 'rebound' scenario, the GDP per 
capita by 2060 is the same as in the AWG 
baseline (the deterioration relative to the baseline 
up to 2014 is offset by the improvement between 
2015 and 2020). Finally, a more marked 
reduction in the GDP per capita level is observed 
in the 'permanent shock' scenario, where GDP 
per capita  is 10% lower than in the AWG 
baseline in 2020, 14% lower in 2040 and 18% 
lower in 2060, reflecting lower growth 
throughout the projection period up to 2060. 
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The crisis may have a considerable adverse 
budgetary impact if its effects on medium-
term growth are not reversed 
In terms of budgetary impact, the question of 
whether the shock is temporary or permanent 
determines its potential magnitude. An 
assessment of the public budget impact of these 
alternative scenarios has been carried out on the 
basis of the elasticities calculated for the 
sensitivity analysis. This provides only a 
preliminary indication of the impact of the 
alternative crisis scenarios.  
Graph 35: Potential budgetary impact of the crisis, euro 
area (projected change in the total cost of ageing, pp of 
GDP, 2007-60) 
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Source: 2009 Ageing Report, Commission services. 
The 'lost decade' scenario reveals that the age-
related government expenditure increases faster 
over the first decade of the projection period, 
and then stabilises relative to the AWG baseline. 
Between 2007 and 2020, the total increase in age-
related expenditure would be 0.9 pp of GDP 
higher than the AWG baseline and would then 
remain stable through to 2060. The 'permanent 
shock' scenario shows a constant widening of the 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio compared with the 
baseline. Between 2007 and 2020, age-related 
public expenditure would increase by 1.2 pp of 
GDP more than the AWG baseline. Over the 
entire projection period, however, the public age-
related spending-to-GDP ratio would be 1.8 pp 
of GDP higher than the AWG baseline. 
 
 
6.  Policy implications 
The slowdown in the GDP growth potential is 
already projected to happen in the next decade in 
the euro area on account of demographic trends, 
and the economic crisis aggravates the slowdown 
in a no-policy change scenario. The euro-area 
working-age population is assumed to start to 
decline early next decade, and employment 
growth is projected to turn negative as from the 
2020s. In the medium term, the potential 
persistence of the economic crisis may lead to 
subdued potential growth due to sluggish job and 
productivity growth already, implying a risk of a 
lost decade in terms of wealth creation in the 
euro area.  
These long-term simulations illustrate that at this 
juncture, marked by very subdued economic 
activity and exceptional uncertainty in terms of 
prospects, there is a very real need to put policies 
in place that prevent the current financial crisis 
from turning into a permanent shock to the key 
determinants of potential growth (employment 
and labour productivity), as this would have a 
serious negative impact on future GDP, per 
capita income levels and budgetary conditions. 
The euro-area’s ability to emerge from the slump 
fast and restore high and stable growth and 
sound public finances will depend essentially on 
its ability to deploy targeted and well coordinated 
policy responses built on structural reforms, as 
stressed by the European Economic Recovery 
Plan38 and illustrated by the 'rebound' scenario.  
Once out of the crisis, the long-term prospects 
will also depend on the degree of determination 
for a swift return to sound public finances, as 
recommended in the EERP, and the pursuit of 
structural reforms required by demographic 
change, which will now be all the more important 
to build confidence as part of the exit strategy 
from the crisis. Equally importantly, the 
structural reform agenda designed to tackle the 
demographic challenge needs to be strengthened. 
This means raising employment rates 
substantially and, in particular, helping and 
encouraging the ageing baby-boomers to stay in 
the labour market rather than retire early, as 
previous generations have tended to do. The 
euro-area's best chance of ensuring that ageing 
                                                     
38  COM (2008) 800 final, 26 November 2008. 
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will not be perceived as a threat, but as a historic 
achievement, lies in not wasting the potential of 
these baby-boom generations.  
These points of reference confirm the validity of 
the three-pronged strategy to cope with the 
economic and budgetary challenges posed by 
ageing populations, as adopted by the Stockholm 
European Council in 2001, namely, (i) reducing 
debt at a fast pace; (ii) raising employment rates 
and productivity; and (iii) reforming pension, 
healthcare and long-term care systems. 
The Commission stressed in its Communication 
on population ageing of 29 April39 the need for 
resolute and determined efforts from the 
Member States to put in place all the policies 
needed to ensure that the euro area emerges 
from the financial and economic crisis with solid 
growth potential and the ability to make full use 
of its human resources. Expanding the degree to 
which existing factors of production have been  
39  COM (2009) 180, 29 April 2009. 
used so far is the key to getting the euro-area 
economies back on a path of solid long-term 
growth. For this to happen, a comprehensive exit 
strategy built on structural reforms will be 
essential. In particular, this will involve 
prolonging working life and increasing the 
participation of youth, women and older 
workers, reforming tax and benefit systems to 
make work pay along the flexicurity principle, 
reforming pension systems and making health 
and long-term care systems more efficient, 
alongside the necessary investment in education 
and research. Putting the emphasis on these 
policies at the present juncture will help the euro 
area both to emerge more resiliently from the 
current recession and to address the challenges 
of an ageing society. By vigorously pursuing the 
reform agenda, by investing massively in the 
quality of human resources and by removing 
barriers to the full use of its labour force, the 
euro area can emerge stronger from the current 
economic crisis. 
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